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At this time in North Carolina the well-informed attorney with
considerable experience in dealing with various types of security
interests could at best hazard an educated guess as to the relative
priorities of a conditional sales contract and a trust receipt; of a
chattel mortgage and lien on accounts receivable or factor's lien.
There has been no unified or integrated statutory scheme and only
scanty judicial opinion defining the relationship between the myriad
statutes that have been enacted through the years in response to
specific need. The purpose of Part 3 of Article 9, achieved through
borrowing from the Federal Bankruptcy Act, prior statutes such as
the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, and the common-law background,
is to provide for this default in existing law while at the same time
establishing a new set of rules of priority designed to take into
account exceptions necessitated by the commercial settings of partic-
ular transactions. It is in Part 3 of Article 9 that the significance of
the definitions contained in sections 9-105, 9-106 and 9-109 becomes
most apparent. One cannot solve with assurance the problems of
priority without knowing within which of the definitions the collat-
eral fits. If this is kept in mind, the apparent complexity of the
Uniform Commercial Code priority rules can be understood, if not
completely appreciated. Also it should be understood that, basically,
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Article 9 is complex only where the transactions to which the rules
apply are complex. The simple transactions, with rare exception,
are subject to simple priority rules that lead to results generally
consistent with the existing law. However, this is not to say that
the priority rules leave no unanswered questions, are without some
ambiguities, and are always based upon the soundest possible policies.
Such deficiencies are to be expected in any statute of this magnitude
and Article 9 is no exception, although it probably has fewer defi-
ciencies, at this time, than any other secured transactions statute
in the past proposed or enacted. The purpose of this paper is to
examine the various priority rules of Article 9 and to relate them,
insofar as is thought useful, to the existing North Carolina law.
PERFECTION
"Perfection" is the word that, under Article 9, signifies the
secured party's status of protection from intervention by the subse-
quently acquired rights of third parties.' However, it is a term of
art; no emotional overtones should be attached to it and it has pre-
cisely the significance reasonable interpretation of Article 9 attrib-
utes to it. Holding a perfected security interest under Article 9
will be the rough equivalent of holding a properly recorded condi-
tional sales contract or chattel mortgage under present North Caro-
lina law, but such a simple comparison should not be relied upon
too extensively. As will be seen, perfection is not an absolute con-
cept; it does not confer absolute protection 2 and it is not the exclusive
key to priorities of conflicting claims.8 Nevertheless, the time and
method of perfection are the points at which initial inquiry must
be made in dealing with most priority problems.
Subsection 9-303 (1) provides that perfection is achieved when
the security interest has "attached and when all of the applicable steps
required for perfection have been taken."4 The reason for this
' "Perfection" has long had essentially the same usage under the Federal
Bankruptcy Act §§ 60(a)(2), 67(d)(5), 30 Stat. 562, 564 (1898), as
amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 96(a)(2), 107(d)(5) (1964).
'Several types of subsequent purchasers of the collateral will take priority
over the perfected security interest, see infra pp. 787-93, as will the holder
of a possessory lien created by operation of law. G.S. § 25-9-310.
The time of "filing," as distinguished from the time of "perfection,"
determines priorities between two consensual security interests that are per-
fected by filing. G.S. § 25-9-312(5) (a). See infra pp. 795-97.
' G.S. § 25-9-303(1). A security interest "attaches" when "there is agree-
ment ... that it attach and value is given and the debtor has rights in the
collateral." G.S. § 25-9-204(1).
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apparent inanity is that it is impossible, because of the several meth-
ods of perfection permitted under Article 9, to state with a higher
level of abstraction a general rule regarding the time of perfection.
At least three factors justify more than one method of perfection.
Acts that will impart sufficient notice with reference to one type of
collateral will impart no or insufficient notice of the secured party's
interest in another type of collateral. It is in most cases proper and
desirable to give the secured party and debtor some freedom in
choosing the method by which notice is given. And some types of
security interests are so transient that traditional methods of per-
fection-recording and possession in the secured party-are not
commercially feasible while protection of the interest is commercially
desirable. Article 9 sanctions three basic methods of perfection.
Depending upon the type of collateral involved or upon certain
characteristics of the security interest and the consideration there-
for,5 the secured party may perfect by (1) filing a financing state-
The following table illustrates the basic distinctions and permissible
methods of perfection. It is offered with the caveat that it does not tell all.
Method of Perfection Permitted
Type of Collateral Filing Possession Automatic
1. Consumer Goods
2. Inventory
3. Farm Products
4. Equipment
5. Instruments
(a) non-negotiable
(b) negotiable
6. Documents
(a) non-negotiable
(b) negotiable
7. Chattel Paper
yes I yes
yes, but would
probably lose
character as in-
ventory.
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes yes
yes Iyes
yes, if purchase money secur-
ty interest in collateral other
.han a motor vehicle or a fix-
ure. § 9-302(1) (d).
1-1o
,1o
nly if "farm" equipment not
i fixture having purchaseI)rice of less than $2500 and
ecurity interest is for pur-
hase money. § 9-302(1) (c).
ces, for 21 days after attach-
ng it for new value under
xvritten agreement. § 9-304(4).
Also for 21 days when de-
livered over for specified pur-
poses. § 9-304(5).
probably for 21 days when de-
livered for specified purposes.
§ 9-304(5).
same as for instruments above.
no
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ment, (2) taking possession of the collateral, or (3) doing nothing
other than creating a security interest that has attached.6
In some commercial transactions each of these methods of per-
fection will have been used at some stage in the process of ac-
quisition of the security interest and transfer of possession to the
collateral to the debtor. In such circumstances the necessity of sub-
section 9-303(2) is apparent. That subsection provides that if the
security interest is once perfected and subsequently it becomes neces-
sary or desirable to perfect by a different method, the security
interest shall be deemed to have been continuously perfected provided
that there was no time after initial perfection during which the
security interest was unperfected. This dates the time of perfec-
tion, where such is important to priority, from the time of initial
perfection rather than the time the last method of perfection was
taken.
I. FILING
A. When Permitted
Public recordation or filing of evidence of the security interest
has long been the legislative solution to the problem of giving ade-
quate notice of security interests and other transfers to interested
third parties. Article 9 continues this solution with some refinements
and distinctions not heretofore apparent in North Carolina. Filing
a financing statement in accordance with Part 4 of Article 9 is a
permissible method of perfection of any security interest in "goods,"
8. Accounts yes no only if the transfer and others
9. Contract Rights yes no from the same debtor do not
constitute a "significant part"
of debtor's outstanding ac-
counts. § 9-302(l) (e).
10. General Intangibles yes no no
' This third "method" will often be referred to in this article as "auto-
matic" perfection. This collective reference is not, intended to imply that
"automatic" perfection uniformly gives the same degree of protection or is
permitted for the same reasons. When describing perfection of a security
interest in instruments and negotiable documents under G.S. § 25-9-304(4),
the adjective "temporary" should be added. The temporary perfection after
turnover of instruments or documents for specific purposes under G.S. §
25-9-304(5), although for convenience discussed under the general heading
of automatic perfection, cannot be properly described as "automatic."
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other than motor vehicles which are required to be registered' and
security interests subjected by United States statute to national
registration.' Filing may also be used to perfect a security interest
in chattel paper and negotiable documents.9 Perfection of a security
interest or other transferee's interest in accounts, contract rights
or general intangibles can be achieved exclusively by filing. The
filing of a financing statement or security agreement covering "in-
struments" will not result in perfection.Y
B. Mechanics of Filing
Article 9 adopts a "notice" filing system, a type that has been
in effect in North Carolina under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act'
and the Factor's Lien Act. 2 The objective of such a system is to
apprise interested third parties of the fact of possible adverse
interest, leaving to inquiry of the debtor the ascertainment of the
extent and terms of existence of the interest. The objective can be
adequately achieved through something less than the present require-
ment of recording the complete conditional sales contract or chattel
mortgage agreement. Article 9 requires filing of a "financing state-
ment," which need contain only (1) the names and addresses of
the debtor and the secured party,'" (2) a description of the collateral,
G.S. § 25-9-302(3) (b). The security interest in a motor vehicle normal-
ly will be noted on the certificate of title. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-58
(1965). A security in a vehicle that is exempt from registration by N. C.
GEN. STAT. § 20-51 (1965) must be perfected under the provisions of
Article 9 applicable to the class of collateral.
8 G.S. § 25-9-302(3) (a). E.g., Security interests in aircraft can be per-
fected only by filing with the Federal Aviation Agency. Federal Aviation
Act, 72 Stat. 772 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1964). See G.S.§ 25-9-302, comment 8.
G.S. § 25-9-304(1).
" Ibid. This exception is justified on the ground that the commercial
use of "instruments" as collateral does not contemplate possession being in
the debtor for a long period of time; therefore, need for permitting perfec-
tion by filing is not apparent. G.S. § 25-9-304, comment 1. The reason why
the same cannot be said for negotiable documents is not stated. However,
the fact that the negotiable document is often the initial "form" in which
the secured party finds goods in which he will claim a security interest
after the document has been redeemed offers some basis for permitting a
single early filing that will result in perfection before and after redemption
of the document.11N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-46 to -66 (Supp. 1965).12 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44-70 to -77 (Supp. 1965).
" The address of the secured party must be one "from which information
concerning the security interest can be obtained." "A mailing address" of
the debtor will be sufficient. G.S. § 25-9-402(1).
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by specific item or by type,14 and (3) the signatures of the debtor
and the secured party.'5 From this minimal public record the inter-
ested third party can acquire sufficient knowledge to enable him to
make additional private inquiry, of or through the debtor, 6 to ascer-
tain the amount of the outstanding debt, the maturity date of the
obligation, and the exact identity of the collateral covered."" Nothing
is gained by requiring that the entire agreement or agreements be
made a part of the public record when the debtor has either knowl-
edge of or access to the information. The third party is amply pro-
tected if he can determine, without risk of duplicity on the part
of debtor, that a security interest does exist. If the debtor should
refuse to give the desired information or sign a request for informa-
tion, the third party is free to refuse to deal with the debtor.' s
" If the collateral is crops or fixtures (including goods which are to
become fixtures), the real estate involved must be described and, in North
Carolina, the name of the record owner or lessee of the real estate must be
included. G.S. § 25-9-402(3).
16 The signature of the debtor is not required where collateral subject to
a security interest is brought from another state or where the secured party
is attempting to perfect as to proceeds of collateral subject to a perfected
security interest. G.S. § 25-9-402(2). The number of reported controversies
indicates a lack of awareness of the necessity of the secured party's signa-
ture on the financing statement. The two appellate courts dealing with
situations where the secured party has failed to affix formally his signature
have rescued the secured party on the grounds that the typed name and
address of the secured party on the standard form is sufficient "authentica-
tion" of the financing statement where he misunderstood the instructions,
Benedict v. Lebowitz, 346 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1965), or "that a period of
indulgence should be granted in connection with cases arising under the
Commercial Code." Alloway v. Stuart, 385 S.W.2d 41, 44 (Ky. Ct. App.
1964). The reliance by the court in the Benedict case upon the "substantial
compliance" provision, UCC § 9-402(5), could give to the case broader
implications for secured parties who neglect to sign the financing statement,
as it could indicate a willingness on the part of the court to dispense with
the requirement of secured party's "signature" where ability to acquire the
basic information from the financing statement is not impaired. Nevertheless,
omission of the secured party's signature is not recommended.
1 G.S. § 25-9-208 provides a method whereby the uncertain debtor can
require the secured party to render a statement of amount due and, where
the secured party's records permit, approve a list of the collateral claimed.
This method of acquiring information is not available directly to a third
party, but, if the third party is actually "interested," the debtor should not
object to signing a request.
17 Even if the third party acquires correct information given in good
faith by the secured party, he risks having his security interest subordinated
to subsequent advances made by the original secured party where the first-
to-file rule of priority is applicable. See 1 COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS,
SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6.08[5]
(1963) [hereinafter cited as COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS].
18 This rationale cannot be applied to the "lien creditor." But he has, by
prior extension of unsecured credit, accepted the risk of subsequent total
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However, "notice" filing and its concomitant short-form financ-
ing statement are most useful in those situations where the parties
contemplate a continuing relationship, either through subsequent
execution of additional security agreements or through the use of
the after-acquired property and future advances clauses in an initial
agreement. It would make little sense to require that parties to a
single, nonrecurring type of security interest, such as a conditional
sales contract, execute a written agreement and a financing state-
ment, and the Code does not so require. The security agreement-
the entire written contract between the parties-may be used as a
financing statement, 9 provided that it meets the requirements. In
most cases this means only that the secured party must, in addition
to normal execution, sign the security agreement to make it usable
in the public record. The converse is not necessarily true. A financ-
ing statement cast in a form similar to that suggested by subsection
9-402(3) is not a written security agreement that can be used as a
basis for enforcing the interest under section 9-203.2O
The financing statement may be filed at any time-before or
after the security interest exists or attaches.2 ' Filing before the
security interest attaches will not result in perfection of the inter-
est," but it will confer priority over any subsequently filed security
interest without regard to the time of perfection of either.3 A
filing remains effective for a period of five years unless the financing
statement indicates a maturity date of the obligation-and such in-
dication is not required-in which case the filing is effective until
sixty days after the specified maturity date but not more than five
years.24 If the maturity date of the obligation is more than five years
from the date of the filing or has been extended beyond the date
stated in the original filing, the secured party, with or without the
encumbrance of the debtor's property. He is in no position to claim dis-
advantage as a result of being unable to ascertain, immediately prior to levy,
the exact amount of the debt or the collateral covered.
oG.S. § 25-9-401(1).
'
0 American Card Co. v. H.M.N. Co., 196 A.2d 150 (R.I. 1963).
G.S. § 25-9-402(1); Int re United Thrift Stores, Inc., 242 F. Supp. 714(D.N.J. 1965). This will probably result in the North Carolina court's
changing its approach to the validity of recording made before the debtor
owns the collateral. Compare National Bank v. Greensboro Motor Co., 264
N.C. 568, 142 S.E.2d 166 (1965), with Chandler v. Cameron, 229 N.C. 62,
47 S.E.2d 528 (1948).
22 G.S. § 25-9-303(1).
" G.S. § 25-9-312(5) (a).
24G.S. § 25-9-403(2).
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cooperation of the debtor, may extend the effectiveness of the origi-
nal filing for an additional five years or, if desired, less, by filing
a "continuation" statement within six months preceding the original
maturity date or expiration of the five-year period and before the
original filing expires.25 If the secured party neglects to keep the
filing effective, perfection and priority will be lost.
An instrument is deemed to be filed under Article 9 when it is
presented with a tender of fees or accepted by the filing officer.2"
Presently, in North Carolina, an instrument is not recorded so as
to be notice to third parties until it is properly indexed. 7 Therefore,
the risk of derelictions of the filing officer is now on the party
offering the instrument for record.2 Section 9-403(1) will shift
the risk to inquiring third parties.29
The North Carolina version of the Uniform Commercial Code
contains an additional section3" in Part 4 of Article 9. The added
section makes a distinction between "filing" and "recording," per-
mitting any county to serve notice on the Secretary of State designat-
ing itself as a "recording" county, and permitting the secured party
to elect to "record" his security agreement rather that "file" it.
Hopefully, the only effect of the rather formidable-looking addi-
tion will be to permit the continued use of reproduction machines
owned by the county. A "filing" county will accept the instrument
offered by the secured party retaining it for the public record; a
"recording" county will make a copy of the instrument, use the
copy for the public record, and return the original to the secured
party.
C. Place of Filing8l
The ideal place for filing or recording notice of security interests
is the place that results in no inconvenience to the secured party or
the subsequent inquiring third party, while affording certainty of
2" G.S. § 25-9-403(3). The continuation statement must state its pur-
pose, contain the file number of the original financing statement, and be
signed by the secured party.20 G.S. § 25-9-403(1).
27 Johnson Cotton Co. v. Hobgood, 243 N.C. 227, 90 S.E.2d 541 (1955)
(dictum); Story v. Slade, 199 N.C. 596, 155 S.E. 256 (1930). Contra, N. C.
GLN. STAT. § 45-58(c) (Supp. 1965) (Uniform Trust Receipts Act).Ely v. Norman, 175 N.C. 294, 95 S.E. 543 (1918).
20Ex-Cello Corp. v. Oneida Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 342 F.2d 294 (2d
Cir. 1965) (dictum).
20 G.S. § 25-9-408.
"1 See generally 1 COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, ch. 6B.
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application to the secured party and certainty of location to the
third party. With interests in real property, the choice is obvious
and simple-the geographical recording unit within which the prop-
erty is located. However, the mobility of personal property pre-
cludes the simple choice. The location of the property, the residence
or place of business of the debtor, or some central location within
the jurisdiction each has some rational basis as a place for filing and
some disadvantages inconsistent with the objectives noted above.
Rather than adopting a single rule for the entire spectrum of secur-
ity interests and types of debtors, the alternative Code filing system
adopted by North Carolina utilizes all of the four rational possibili-
ties in appropriate situations.
If the security interest is subject to the filing requirements of
Part 432 and the collateral is consumer goods or farm-connected
property-farm equipment, farm products, "accounts, contract rights
or general intangibles arising from . .. the sale of farm products
by the farmer" 33-the financing statement must be filed in the coun-
ty where the debtor resides. If the debtor is not a resident of the
state, the filing shall be in the county where the "goods" are located. 4
In addition, if the collateral is crops, a filing must be made in the
county where the land upon which they are grown is located if that
is not also the county in which the debtor resides.
If the collateral is goods that are or are to become fixtures,
without regard to the fact that they might also be properly classified
as consumer goods or equipment under section 9-109, the financing
statement must be filed in the county where the land to which they
32 Nothing here said about "place" of filing is applicable to security
interests excluded from filing under Part 4 by G.S. §§ 25-9-302(3)-(5), or
security interests excluded entirely from the operation of Article 9 by G.S.
§ 25-9-104.
83 G.S. § 25-9-401 (1) (a). The term "farm products" is defined in G.S.
§ 25-9-109(3) as "crops or livestock or supplies used or produced in farm-
ing operations or . . . products of crops or livestock in their unmanufactured
states ... in the possession of a debtor engaged in ... farming operations."
34 G.S. § 25-9-401(1) (a). Accounts, contract rights and general intangi-
bles are not "goods." G.S. § 25-9-105(1)(f). Thus, § 9-401 leaves un-
certain the place of filing the security interest in "accounts, contract rights,
or general intangibles arising from the sale of farm products" if the debtor
is a nonresident. Accounts and contract rights have a "situs" at the office of
the assignor where records concerning them are kept. G.S. § 25-9-103(1).
It is only a guess that filing at the location of that office would be sufficient
in this situation on the theory that this is where they are "kept." If the
farmer does not keep the records of the accounts, etc., in this state, the
security interest probably would not be in any way subject to the law of
this jurisdiction. G.S. § 25-9-103(1).
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are or are to be affixed is located.3" No other filing is necessary
with respect to fixtures.8 6
A security interest in any other type of collateral that may be
perfected by filing-nonfarm connected equipment, accounts, con-
tract rights and general intangibles, inventory, negotiable documents,
chattel paper-is subject to a dual filing requirement. A financing
statement must be filed centrally, in the office of the Secretary of
State, and locally, in the county where the debtor maintains his sole
place of business in this state.37 If the debtor has a place of busi-
ness in more than one county in the state, local filing is not required.
If the debtor has no place of business in the state, but resides herein,
the local filing shall be in the county where the debtor resides. In
rare situations where the debtor neither resides in the state nor
maintains a place of business here, filing only in the Secretary of
State's office will be sufficient.
The rules of subsection 9-401(1) may appear complex, but as
long as the type of collateral with which one is dealing is kept in
mind, they should not be as difficult to apply nor as potentially prob-
lematical as the current rules of determining the recording place of
conditional sales contracts and chattel mortgages.3" Locating the
debtor's residence39 or the place of business of the debtor and deter-
mining whether, at the time of filing, the debtor had a place of
business in more than one county,40 will undoubtedly consume some
of the court's time, but probably no amount of legislative definition
""G.S. § 25-9-401(1) (b). The Code terminology is "where a mortgage
on the real estate concerned would be filed . . ." which, in North Carolina
is the county where the land is located. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-20.1 (Supp.
1965).
" This is not to say that additional filing is not desirable in view of the
ambiguity which surrounds the word "fixtures." See text accompanying
notes 216-18 infra.
7 7G.S. § 25-9-401(1) (c).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-20.2 (Supp. 1965). The rules there set out
require distinctions between individuals, partnerships, domestic corporations
and foreign corporations, and a determination, for the second, of the principal
place of business and, for the third and fourth groups, the principal office
if incorporated or domesticated before July 1, 1957.
" "Residence" in this context has been defined by the court to be the
person's actual place of abode, not necessarily his "domicile." See, e.g.,
Sheffield v. Walker, 231 N.C. 556, 58 S.E.2d 356 (1950); Industrial Dis-
count Corp. v. Radecky, 205 N.C. 163, 170 S.E. 640 (1933). There is no
reason to depart from these decisions under the Code.
" In In re Falkof, 2 UCC REPORTING SERV. 731 (D. Mass. Jan. 9, 1963),
the referee in bankruptcy held that the debtor did not have a second "place of
business" where in his home he received mail and telephone calls and held
conferences that related to the establishment of his dry cleaning business.
[Vol. 44
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could decide, in advance, the cases likely to arise. It should be noted
that the "place of business" of a corporation under this section is
probably the place from which the corporation in fact conducts its
business, which is not necessarily the county where its registered
office is located.
Subsection 9-401 (3) provides for continued validity of an origi-
nal filing properly made, even though the facts determining place of
filing-residence or place of business of the debtor or classification
of the collateral-thereafter change. Thus, the burden of determin-
ing whether the facts have changed is on the third party.
II. TAKING POSSESSION OF THE COLLATERAL
Originating with pledge or pawn transaction, the secured party's
taking of possession of the collateral under a security agreement has
traditionally been deemed to give sufficient notoriety to the possible
existence of an adverse interest in personal property to entitle the
secured party to priority over subsequent lien creditors of or pur-
chasers from the debtor.4 Article 9 will permit continued use of
possession as a method of perfection,42 making explicit some here-
tofore implicit assumptions concerning the type of property subject
to possession. "Possession" by the secured party gives notice to
third parties only where the property is tangible or is represented
by something tangible and can, in a meaningful way, be taken from,
the control of the debtor. Therefore, Article 9 limits the use of
possession as a method of perfection to security interests in "goods,
instruments, negotiable documents, or chattel paper."43
It is probably not accurate to assume that the secured party may
perfect a security interest in any type of "goods" 44 by taking posses-
sion. Those security interests that must be perfected by registra-
tion under a United States statute or by rotation on a certificate of
title45 may also be subject to a requirement in applicable statute
that the interest be so registered or noted to be valid against third
parties. The Federal Aviation Act provides unequivocably that the
interest must be recorded under the act to be valid as to any third
"'See, e.g., Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Wayne Fin. Co., 262 N.C.
711, 138 S.E.2d 481 (1964); McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. Crawford,
253 N.C. 100, 116 S.E.2d 491 (1960).
42 G.S. § 25-9-305.
,G.S. § 25-9-305.
"As defined in G.S. § 25-9-105(1) (f).
,5 G.S. § 25-9-302(3).
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person who does not have "actual notice" of the unrecorded inter-
est,40 and possession by the secured party is not, standing alone,
sufficient to charge third parties with notice.47 Thus, security inter-
ests in aircraft are not automatically subject to perfection by taking
possession of the collateral.
The same problem could arise in connection with motor vehicles
and state statutes requiring perfection by notation on a certificate
of title. If the certificate-of-title act provides for perfection only
by way of compliance with its provisions, section 9-305, even though
enacted later, should not be construed to permit perfection by taking
of possession in contradiction to the policy of the certificate-of-title
law.4' However, the North Carolina court may not face the exact
construction problem presented by section 9-305 and the Motor
Vehicle Act because, without the aid of such subsequent enactment,
it has stated in dictum that the recently amended notation of liens
section4" of the Motor Vehicle Act permits perfection of a chattel
mortgage by taking possession of the vehicles.50 If that dictum
holds, the secured party will be justified in taking possession of
automobiles, leaving the certificates of title in the hands of the
debtor, and relying upon possession as a permissible method of per-
fection under section 9-305.
"672 Stat. 772 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1403(c) (1964).
," Marsden v. Southern Flight Serv., Inc., 227 F. Supp. 411 (M.D.N.C.
9.G.S. § 25-9-302(3) is neutral on the question, providing only that the
"filing provisions" do not apply if the interest is subject to the specified
types of statutes.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-58 (1965).
" Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Wayne Fin. Co., 262 N.C. 711, 138
S.E.2d 481 (1964) (dictum). The court reached this broad conclusion in
the face of the extraordinary preamble to the act, which provided, "Whereas,
a certificate of title that can be relied upon as a ready means by which all
legal interests in motor vehicles may be determined would be in the public
interest," and the express language of the act, "Except as provided in G.S.
20-58.9, a security interest . . . is not valid against creditors of the owner
or subsequent transferees or lien holders of the vehicle unless perfected as
provided in this chapter." The facts as stated by the court make the opinion
even more mystifying. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-58.9 (1965) exempts
from the requirement of notation on the certificate of title security inter-
ests created by a manufacturer or dealer who holds the automobile for
resale. Not being subject to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-58 (1965), such
security interests implicitly should be subject to normal perfection rules,
i.e., recording under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-20 (Supp. 1965). The debtor
was an automobile dealer. All of the mortgages were recorded, the ones
to which the court ultimately gave priority being recorded first. Therefore,
the court could have more reasonably applied N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-58.9
(1965) and reached an identical result without ever mentioning possession.
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Possession will be an equally effective method of perfection
where the collateral is negotiable documents, 1 e.g., negotiable ware-
house receipts or bills of lading and other documents which run
to order or bearer and with which the goods are deemed integrated
in the sense that the presentation of the piece of paper is the exclu-
sive method of obtaining possession or control of the goods from
the bailee. The method for taking "possession" of collateral that
is in the possession of a bailee, who has not issued a negotiable
document covering the collateral is, under the Code, the giving of
notice to the bailee.52 When notice is received by the bailee, the
secured party will have completed the acts necessary for perfection
if the security interest has attached. This is in contrast to the com-
mon-law rule, which required, in addition to receipt of notice, the
bailee's "attornment," or acknowledgment that he held the goods
at the pleasure of the party giving notice, before that party would be
deemed to be in possession of the goods.n3
The problems of perfection by possession as related to writings
and intangibles that are or represent the obligations of third parties
are primarily definitional. It is possible to perfect by taking posses-
sion of "instruments" and "chattel paper." '54 A security interest in
"accounts," "contract rights," or "general intangibles"' '55 cannot be
perfected by taking "possession." 56 The terms instruments, chattel
paper, accounts, and contract rights all describe types of obligations
of third parties (obligors) which, in this context, the obligee or
owner thereof desires to use as collateral for an advance made by
the secured party. Chattel paper is a type of monetary obligation,
"' "Document" as used in Article 9 means "Document of Title," as de-
fined in G.S. § 25-1-201(15). G.S. § 25-9-105(1) (e). The document of
title must purport to be issued by a bailee and cover identified goods in
the hands of the bailee. Domestically, the document is negotiable "if by its
terms the goods are to be delivered to bearer or to the order of a named
person." G.S. § 25-7-104(1) (a). An automobile certificate of title and like
instruments are not "documents of title" because, if for no other reason,
they are not issued by a bailee. See Semple v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 215 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
G.S. § 25-9-305.58E.g., United States v. Lucas, 148 F. Supp. 768 (M.D.N.C. 1957).
"G.S. § 25-9-305.
5 "General Intangibles" is the residual classification of collateral. Any-
thing that does not properly fit within the other six basic classifications is
a general intangible. G.S. § 25-9-106. "Examples are good will, literary
rights .. rights to performance ... copyrights, trademarks and patents ...."
G.S. § 25-9-106, comment. See generally 2 COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, ch. 21.
" This conclusion is derived by implication from the omission of these
classes collateral from G.S. § 25-9-305.
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payment of which is secured by a "security interest in or lease of
specific goods" arising out of the transaction giving rise to the.
obligation.5 7 A typical example is the conditional sales contract
under which major consumer appliances are sold. However, any
written security agreement that evidences or that is accompanied by
written evidence of the obligation will be chattel paper, without
regard to whether the accompanying instrument is negotiable or
non-negotiable.
The second class of third-party obligations that may be per-
fected by taking possession is the instrument. " Beginning with the
readily recognizable negotiable instrument and corporate security,
the concept otherwise rapidly drops off into the obfuscated area
between the non-negotiable instrument, which can be possessed
for purposes of perfection, and the account, " which cannot be so
possessed. Drawing the line between the non-negotiable instrument
which is not a security and the account is, in the abstract, not
difficult-any written evidence of an obligation will be an "instru-
ment" if it is a type that is in the business community normally
"transferred by delivery with any necessary endorsement or as-
signment," that is, any writing that is generally regarded by the
business community as so embodying the obligation that rights to
the obligation must be transferred through transfer of the instru-
ment. The official comments further suggest that the obligation
must be evidenced by an "indispensable instrument,"6 which, if
applicable, brings the Code definition around to a more familiar,
if not more certain, concept. The concept of indispensable instru-
ment has been relevant in determining whether the obligation can
be attached by creditors,6 can be the subject of a common-law
51 G.S. § 25-9-105(1) (b).
"' "Instrument" is defined in G.S. § 25-9-105(g) as "a negotiable instru-
ment, or a security (defined in Section 8-102) or any other writing which
evidences a right to the payment of money and is not itself a security agree-
ment or lease and is of a type which is in the ordinary course of business
transferred by delivery with any necessary endorsement."
" An "account" is "any right to payment for goods sold or leased or for
services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper."
G.S. § 25-9-106.
'o G.S. § 25-9-106, comment.
"E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-315(a) (5) (Supp. 1965), which subjects
to levy "choses in action represented by instruments which are indispensable
to the chose in action." The North Carolina court has apparently not con-
strued the subsection.
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gift,6" is covered by assignment of accounts receivable acts, 3 as
well as whether it can be the collateral in a common-law pledge
transaction.6" In these contexts, and probably under the Code, the
essential question is whether the instrument customarily controls
the right to payment.6 5 Examples of such instruments include
"share certificates, bonds, interim certificates, savings bank books,
. . . insurance policies," 6 and non-negotiable warrants issued by
the United States.6 In addition, non-negotiable promissory notes
or drafts would, under certain circumstances, have been considered
"indispensable." 6
It is unlikely that the attitudes of the courts will change signifi-
cantly as a result of the minor rewording of the concept as it
appears in section 9-105. Of course, there will not be a problem
with reference to stock certificates or bonds as they are expressly
included in the definition of instruments. The insurance policy or
the passbook for a savings account will continue to be governed
by the common law or applicable statutes as security interests there-
in are excluded entirely from the operation of Article 9.'9 If the
secured party has a security interest in an "indispensable instru-
ment," one that controls the right to payment as a matter of law
or by contract and that is generally transferred by delivery of the
piece of paper, he can perfect by taking possession. If his security
interest is in an open book account or a simple memorandum of a
contract calling for payment in return for goods or services ren-
" See generally 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 439 (3d ed. 1960).
"E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-77 (Supp. 1965), although not expressed
in terms of indispensability, clearly reaches for the same concept in defining
what is not an "account receivable" as an "other instrument, the ... posses-
sion . . . of which customarily gives to the . . . holder . . . the right to
payment thereon."
" RESTATEMENT, SECURITY § 1, comment e (1941).
" This question is not determined solely by the fact that the contract
for payment is required by a Statute of Frauds to be in writing. M. M.
Landy, Inc. v. Nicholas, 221 F.2d 923, 929 (5th Cir. 1955) (dictum).
" RESTATEMENT, SECURITY § 1, comment e (1941). See also 3 WILLIS-
TON, CONTRACTS § 439 (3d ed. 1960).
" M. M. Landy, Inc. v. Nicholas, 221 F.2d 923, 929 (5th Cir. 1955)
(dictum). The case also includes an excellent discussion of the entire prob-
lem.
"sE.g., Jerome v. Eastern Fin. Corp., 317 Mass. 364, 58 N.E.2d 122
(1944), where, although the court phrased its decision in terms of estoppel,
a non-negotiable draft issued by an insurance company in payment of a
claim was held to control the right to payment.
" G.S. § 25-9-104(g), (k).
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dered, even though the contract is required to be in writing, he
probably has an interest in an "account" or "contract right" that
can be perfected only by filing.
III. "AUTOMATIC" AND "TEMPORARY" METHODS OF
PERFECTION
For various commercial reasons, Article 9 affords to security
interests in certain types of collateral, under specific circumstances,
the status of perfection from the time the security interest attaches,
without requiring the secured party to file a financing statement
or have possession of the collateral. This "method" of perfection
is herein referred to as "automatic perfection."70
A. Consumer Goods
Perhaps because of an assumed public realization of the likeli-
hood that individuals who purchase major items for personal or
family use are going to purchase on credit and, as a result, there
will be a security interest in the goods, the concession of automatic
perfection is afforded the purchase-money security interest71 in con-
sumer goods.72 The secured party's interest will be perfected from
the time of attachment. This provision, which will change existing
North Carolina law,73 probably will not significantly change exist-
ing practice for many secured parties because of the fact that many
finance companies or vendors, at the present time, do not record
the conditional sales contract or the chattel mortgage arising from
the installment sale of consumer goods. When the Code becomes
effective, these parties can continue their nonfiling and will enjoy
substantially more protection against the debtor's subsequent lien
creditors, including a trustee in bankruptcy,74 and commercial pur-
chasers. 70 However, while the secured party, in this situation, will
have a "perfected" security interest, the interest will not be as
"' The word "automatic" admittedly has limitations in this context. Supra
note 6.
71 Defined in § 9-107. See Hanft, Article Nine: Secured Transactions
-Validity, Rights of the Parties; Default, 44 N.C.L. REV. 716 (1966).
, G.S. § 25-9-302(1) (d).
' The present recording statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-20 (Supp. 1965)
does not recognize any similar exception for consumer goods, nor do the
North Carolina cases.
"It re White, 2 UCC REPORTING SERV. 192 (E.D. Ky. June 8, 1964);
it re Kretzer, 1 UCC REPORTING SRV. 369 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 1955).
"United Gas Improvement Co. v. McFalls, 18 Pa.D. & C. 2d 713, 1 UCC
REPORTING Stay. 508 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1959).
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completely protected as it would be if he filed a financing state-
ment. Where the automatic perfection is claimed as the only basis
for priority, a subsequent party who purchases the goods from the
debtor for his personal or family use or for use in his farming
operations will defeat the security interest. The same type of per-
fection, with the same limitations, is granted the purchase-money
security interest in "farm equipment having a purchase price not in
excess of twenty-five hundred dollars."7
A security interest in goods that are or are to become fixtures
or in motor vehicles required to be licensed, even though the goods
are also consumer goods or farm equipment, cannot be perfected
automatically. The security interest in fixtures must be filed under
Part 4; the security interest in motor vehicles must be perfected
in a manner permitted by the Motor Vehicles Act.
77
While there is no stated limit upon the time for which this
automatic perfection for consumer goods or farm equipment will
be effective, the possibility of unlimited perfection until the pur-
chase price has been paid is complicated by the fact that the distinc-
tions between consumer goods, farm equipment, and other types of
goods are based upon the use to which the collateral is put and not
upon physical characteristics. An item in the hands of a person
using it for his personal use in his home will be consumer goods
under the definitions of section 9-109. If that same person should,
subsequent to the purchase, decide to use the item in his business,
it would become equipment."8 Clearly, the secured party holds a
perfected security interest in the item as consumer goods. But,
since the item is now equipment, which requires filing or possession
for perfection of the security interest, does the secured party's per-
fection continue? This question of effect of changes in use general-
ly was raised in 1954 during the hearings held by the New York
Law Revision Commission.79 There was at that time no satisfactory
7 0 G.S. § 25-9-302(1) (c).
77 G.S. § 25-9-302(1) (c), (d). See supra note 50. A literal reading of
the subsection would indicate that "filing" of the security interest under
this article would be required where the collateral is a motor vehicle and
also consumer goods or farm equipment. Obviously, this would serve no
purpose and the "filing" referred to in G.S. § 25-9-302(1) (c), (d) with
respect to motor vehicles should be construed as "filing or other steps for
perfection required by the Motor Vehicle Act."
" G.S. § 25-9-109(2).
792 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION, REPORT AND HEARINGS ON THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1104 (1954).
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answer as Article 9 did not then purport to solve the general prob-
lems raised by change in use of collateral and the effect on prior
perfection. Subsequently, in 1955, subsection (3) of section 9-401
was amended to read: "A filing which is made in the proper place
in this State continues effective even though the debtor's residence
or place of business or the location of the collateral or its use,
whichever controlled the original filing, is thereafter changed.""0
Does this section apply as well to security interests that have not
been perfected by filing, such as those covered by the consumer-
goods and farm-equipment exceptions? The drafters of that sub-
section apparently thought so. A comment to the amendment
stated ". . . an item bought for personal, family use would be
consumer goods and non-filing or filing with respect thereto would
continue to have the same effect even though the item was subse-
quently used as equipment."'" However, to reach this conclusion,
non-filing must be equated with filing for this purpose, as section
9-401 (3) refers only to security interests that have been perfected
by filing. The language of Article 9 and the general use of the
word "filing" do not appear to support this equation. The language
creating the exceptions is "a financing statement must be filed to
perfect all security interests except .... ,,s2 Grouped with the con-
sumer-goods and farm-equipment exceptions are the perfection-by-
possession and temporary-perfection-of-security-interest-in-instru-
ments-and-documents exceptions. Both of the latter exceptions are
intended to give "perfect[ion] otherwise than by filing"8' 3 in opera-
tion of the priority rules.8 4 It is difficult to see why the automatic
perfection for interests in consumer goods and farm equipment
would not also be perfection otherwise than by filing for that
purpose. If the automatic perfection is perfection otherwise than
by filing for priorities, is it perfection by filing under subsection 9-
402(3) ?
Of course, such a technical construction could be ignored, if
there are compelling reasons for giving the benefit of section
9-402(3) to a secured party who elects to perfect his interest in
consumer goods or farm equipment without filing, or if the prob-
0 The italicized words were added by the 1955 amendment.
"AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Supp. No.
1, at 78 (1955). (Italics added.) See also, Panel Discussion on U.C.C., 19
Bus. LAWYER 20, 41 (1963).
82 G.S. § 25-9-302(1).
8 G.S. § 25-9-312(6).
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lem is totally without significance. An examination of the secured
party's situation with relation to the third-party purchaser reveals
no compelling equity in favor of the secured party. And, while
cases of changes of use may be rare, to the dealer or other person
who purchases from the debtor for other than personal or farm
use,85 the question of whether he can rely upon the use to which
the goods are then being put and the state of the public filings has
significant ramifications that are amplified by the facts that there
is no limit on the value of the consumer goods in which a purchase-
money security interest may be perfected automatically and the limit
on farm equipment is a relatively high 2500 dollars.
Where public filing of a security interest in goods is required,86
the risk of a change in use is no more difficult for the inquiring
party to guard against than is a change in residence or place of
business of the debtor. If the third party has knowledge with refer-
ence to the latter two factors, guarding against the possibility of
change in use is simple-the third party need only search the records
in the county of residence and the Secretary of State's office, or,
where applicable, the location of the place of business, which he
should do in any event if he wants to be certain of the state of
title. On the other hand, where there has been no public filing, it
is impractical, if not impossible, for the third party to find out
with certainty whether there is an unfiled but "perfected" purchase-
money security interest in the goods which he views, for example,
as equipment, but which may at one time have been sold as con-
sumer goods. True, if the goods are, at the time of purchase by
the third party, being used as "consumer goods," he takes a risk
of the unfiled interest in purchasing; but in that situation it is a
risk that can be immediately comprehended from the state of the
goods. When the goods are, at that time, equipment, the risk can
be comprehended only by laborious inquiry of persons who sell
that type of article. Indeed, every piece of equipment8 7 that could
84 G.S. § 25-9-312, comment 4; 1 COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, § 7.05[3][e].
85 The purchaser who buys for his own or farm use will, in any event,
have priority over the unfiled security interest. G.S. § 25-9-307(2).
"' Filing will be required for perfection of a security interest in any type
of goods other than consumer goods or farm equipment. There is no auto-
matic perfection of any type or duration for equipment other than farm
equipment, inventory, or farm products-unless the secured party has per-
fected by possession, and in that event, no change in use problems could
possibly arise.
" If the debtor converted his consumer goods or farm equipment into
1966]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
conceivably be used as consumer goods or farm equipment would be
suspect, even though there was never security interest in it, if the
secured party is as a general matter, able to retain perfection after
the change in use of consumer goods or farm equipment. Further-
more, as between the secured party and the third-party purchaser,
each is theoretically equally able to guard against the chicanery of
the debtor. Where the secured party can protect himself as simply
as by filing and does not do so, the decision should go to the
innocent third party.8
Therefore, the secured party, as an additional risk to his taking
advantage of the concession of automatic perfection, should bear
the burden of loss of perfection if the use of the goods has changed
so as to put the third party in an ambiguous position. 9
B. Accounts and Contract Rights
Filing is not required to perfect a security interest or other
transfer of accounts or contract rights that arises by way of an
assignment of less than a "significant part of the outstanding ac-
counts or contract rights of the assignor."90 Thus, there is an
automatic perfection of such a security interest or transfer. This
section, insofar as it is applicable, would merely continue the com-
mon-law rule, as interpreted in New York and other jurisdictions,9 '
that the first transferee of accounts or contract rights has priority
over subsequent transferees or creditors without giving notice to
the account debtor or filing.9 2 However, to be entitled to this auto-
inventory in his business, the same problem is presented to the purchaser,
but such a problem would be resolved under G.S. § 25-9-307(1), which
gives the buyer in the ordinary course of business clear title over "a security
interest created by his seller."
" This discussion assumes an "innocent" purchaser. Under G.S. § 25-9-
301 no purchaser who has knowledge of the existence of a security interest
will have priority over that interest.
" As a result of loss of perfection, the secured party would also lose to
the lien creditor. The lien creditor in many instances will not have the
same equities in his favor as the purchaser, but the same can be said for
any unperfected interest in a system as adopted by the Code where the lien
creditor's priority does not depend upon the time he extended credit.
0o G.S. § 25-9-302(1) (e).
"
1 E.g., Superior Brassiere Co. v. Zimetbaum, 214 App. Div. 525, 212
N.Y. Supp. 473 (1925).
" Of course, the entire area of assignments of accounts underwent con-
siderable reshuffling after Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder,
318 U.S. 434 (1943). See generally 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 5 60.48 (14th
ed. 1964). The North Carolina solution is N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44-77 to -85(Supp. 1965), enacted in 1945 and repealed as of the effective date of the
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matic perfection, the secured party or transferee will presumably
have the burden of proving that total value of the accounts of the
debtor or transferor held by the secured party do not constitute a
significant part of the total value of all outstanding accounts of the
debtor or transferor. It will not be sufficient to show merely that
the particular transfer, perfection of which is claimed, constituted
less than a significant part of those outstanding accounts. When
the secured party is in doubt whether the transfer does constitute a
significant part, he can file a financing statement covering accounts
of the debtor and achieve perfection in that method. Indeed, it
will be preferable, in all commercial transactions, to follow this
course, as the assignment of any percentage of the debtor's accounts
on a regular basis could be called a significant part of the outstand-
ing accounts even though the percentage did not exceed four or
five per cent at any given time.
C. Instruments and Negotiable Documents
Article 9 permits perfection of a security interest in two other
types of collateral, instruments and negotiable documents, for a
limited period of time, twenty-one days, without requiring filing
or taking of possession of the collateral." The secured party may
take advantage of this automatic perfection without having ever
seen or handled the collateral. The only requirements are that (1)
there be a written security agreement, and (2) the secured party
give "new value." There is no restriction on the purposes for which
the debtor retains possession. Thus, with the instruments and docu-
ments in which the debtor has rights, the secured party can get a
twenty-one-day automatic perfection through the execution of the
security agreement and the making of an advance pursuant thereto.
The twenty-one-day period begins to run from the time of attach-
ment, i.e., from the time of the execution of the agreement or the
Code, G.S. § 25-10-102, which requires filing to protect the assignment.
There is no stated exemption from filing in the present North Carolina
Act, so G.S. § 25-9-302(1) (e) will probably, to the extent it is applicable,
modify the North Carolina position.
03 G.S. § 25-9-304(4), (5). The Uniform Trust Receipts Act, N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 45-48, -53 (Supp. 1965), offers the only existing counterpart to
the Code provisions. The type of transaction sanctioned by G.S. § 25-9-
304(4) might look like the common-law "equitable pledge." See Godwin v.
Murchison Nat'l Bank, 145 N.C. 320, 59 S.E. 154 (1907). Under the Code,
it is not an equitable pledge nor anything else equitable; it is simply a
temporary perfection.
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time of the advance, whichever occurs last. 4 To illustrate the
minimum contact between the secured party and the debtor re-
quired by this section, suppose that a debtor is in possession of
some instruments or documents in which he has an interest and
which he desires to use as collateral for a loan. All that would be
required would be a telephone call to the bank, the execution and
mailing by the debtor of a written agreement describing the col-
lateral, and the bank's crediting of the debtor's account for the
amount of the loan. 5 The bank would have a perfected security
in the described collateral for twenty-one days without ever having
looked at the debtor or the collateral." At the end of the twenty-
one-day period the perfection will lapse unless the bank, in the
meantime, has taken steps to perfect the security interest otherwise,
by filing as to negotiable documents or by taking possession of
instruments.
There is also a probability that the secured party in certain
circumstances can rely upon the temporary perfection, even though
the debtor does not at that time execute a written agreement and
the secured party does not then make an advance. If there is in
existence a written agreement executed at some time in the past
covering instruments or negotiable documents and containing an
after-acquired property clause, no reason appears why that agree-
ment should not satisfy the requirement of subsection 9-304(4).
Furthermore, the Code provides in section 9-108 that where after-
acquired property comes under an antecedent security agreement,
the security interest "shall be deemed to be taken for new value...
if the debtor acquires his rights in such collateral either in the
, G.S. § 25-9-304(4).
" However, where negotiable documents, particularly bills of lading, are
involved, the transaction would rarely be cast in this form. The seller will
have shipped goods under the bills of lading and will prevent the buyer-
debtor from getting possession of the goods or documents by first requiring
payment or acceptance of drafts, usually at the buyer's bank. Thus, the
bank will have possession of the bills of lading, and if a loan is made, the
bank will turn over the documents to the buyer after execution of a security
agreement. The bank probably will then be in a position to rely upon
temporary perfection under G.S. § 25-9-304(5), which it might be well
advised to do for reasons discussed infra pp. 777-79.
" Before becoming too elated about the temporary perfection, secured
parties should realize the inherent limitations of any perfection where the
debtor is left in possession of negotiable documents or instruments. Article
9 does not in any way impair negotiability or rights of purchasers of
negotiable instruments or documents. G.S. § 25-9-309. See text accompany-
ing notes 164-75 infra.
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ordinary course of business or... within a reasonable time after new
value is given."'97 Although the section was primarily intended as
an attempt to forestall the bankruptcy courts from determining
that after-acquired property was given for an antecedent debt,"8 in
specifying what is deemed "new value," it should have application
wherever that term is used in Article 9, including subsection 9-
304(4)." Thus, the secured party could have a perfected security
interest in instruments or negotiable documents without knowing
of their existence, if there is an after-acquired property clause and
the debtor acquires the instruments or documents in the ordinary
course of business within a reasonable time after the original ad-
vance is made.
Subsection 9-304(5) provides for another situation in which
the secured party, having an interest in instruments or documents
of title, will be entitled to a temporary perfection. The effect of
subsection (5) is closely related to the operation of subsection (4)
in the sense that many transactions will arise in which the secured
party may claim the twenty-one-day perfection under either sub-
section. However, subsection (5) is broader in scope of collateral
and types of interests covered and narrower in permissible limits
of operation than subsection (4).
Subsection (5) permits the temporary retention of perfection
of security interests in goods in the possession of a bailee who has
not issued a negotiable document, as well as interests in instru-
ments and negotiable documents. Compared to subsection (4), its
operation is limited by two requirements: (1) the secured party
must have had a perfected interest at the time of the turnover,
which means, in the case of instruments, that the secured party
must have had possession of them or, in the case of negotiable
documents or goods, that the secured party had possession0" or
filed;"'1 and (2) the collateral must be released to the debtor only for
o7 G.S. § 25-9-108. The section and the comments unfortunately give no
hint concerning the factors to be considered in determining what is a reason-
able time after execution of the initial giving of new value.0
°UCC § 9-108, comment 1.
'1 COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS § 7.08[5].
100 The secured party gets "possession" of goods in the hands of a bailee
for perfection purposes when notice is given to the bailee. G.S. § 25-9-305.
'Where a secured party has filed a financial statement which remains
effective, his security interest in the goods or negotiable documents would
be perfected by the filing and would remain perfected when the collateral
is released to the debtor. Therefore, as a practical matter, the necessity for
G.S. § 25-9-304(5) will be restricted to situations where the secured party
1966]
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the specified purposes.' °2 The first requirement has the effect of
preventing the secured party from, after the fact, contending that
he should be entitled to up to forty-two days of perfection on the
grounds that the debtor held possession of the collateral for twenty-
one days under subsection 9-304(4) and for an additional twenty-
one days for the specific purposes enumerated in subsection 9-
304(5). In rare cases the secured party might ultimately realize
out of one transaction forty-two days of the automatic and tempo-
rary perfection; but this would be only where, at the end of the
twenty-one-day period specified in subsection 9-304(4), he took
possession of the collateral, thus perfecting the security interest in
that manner, and subsequently released the collateral to the debtor
for one of the specified purposes under subsection 9-305(5).
A question arises whether the twenty-one-day period mentioned
in subsections 9-304(4) and (5) is actually "perfection" or merely
a "relation-back" or "grace period" within which the secured party
may legitimately perfect his interest and have the perfection relate
back to the time of attachment of the security interest. The ques-
tion, although probably academic where the Bankruptcy Act is in-
volved,10 3 has some significance to the secured party who waits
has not filed, but was using his possession of the collateral as the basis for
initial perfection.
..2 The purposes for which goods or negotiable documents may be re-
leased to the debtor are "ultimate sale or exchange or... loading, unloading,
storing, shipping, transshipping, manufacturing, processing or otherwise
dealing with them in a manner preliminary to their sale or exchange." G.S.
§ 25-9-304(5) (a). Since all of the permitted acts with reference to the
goods or documents must relate to ultimate sale or exchange, the section will
have application primarily to goods that are to become inventory. And a
secured party, who releases equipment or consumer goods for use as such,
would get no benefit from this section.
Instruments can be delivered to the debtor under this section only for
"ultimate sale or exchange or presentation, collection, renewal or registra-
tion of transfer." G.S. § 25-9-304(5) (b).
... At least it is academic as long as the period stated in the Code is no
more than twenty-one days. Under § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, if the twenty-
one-day period is referred to as a period of perfection and the secured party
fails to file or otherwise perfect within twenty-one days, the interest has
not been "so far perfected that no subsequent lien . . . could become superior
to the rights of the transferee," § 60(a) (2), because a lien creditor attach-
ing the property during the gap between the expiration of the twenty-one
days and the subsequent perfection would have priority. G.S. § 25-9-301;
G.S. § 25-9-303, comment 2. If the twenty-one-day period is a relation-back
period, the secured party, by failing to file or take possession within the
twenty-one days, would not be in compliance with state law or the Bankruptcy
Act. § 60(a) (7) (I). Thus, under either theory the transfer to the secured
party would be deemed made at the time he finally perfected the interest by
filing or taking possession, or if he did not later perfect, it would be deemed
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until the twenty-second .day following attachment of the security
interest to perfect by filing. To illustrate, suppose that the secured
party takes a security interest in negotiable documents under sub-
section 9-304(4) relying upon the temporary "perfection," but in-
tending to file later. At some time between the time of attachment
of his interest and the twenty-first day following, a creditor of the
debtor acquires a lien on the documents. The secured party neg-
lects to file his interest until the twenty-second day following
attachment. Under a "relation-back" theory the lien creditor would
prevail because the secured party lost his right to have the subse-
quent perfection deemed to have been made at the date of attach-
ment.0 4 Under a "perfection" theory, however, the secured party
should prevail because the lien creditor's rights did not arise at a
time when the interest was "unperfected,"' 5 without regard to
whether the interest may later have become unperfected. The most
authoritative bankruptcy treatise apparently treats the twenty-one-
day period as a relation-back period.0 6 However, the express lan-
guage of the sections and statements in the official comments indi-
cate an intent that the twenty-one-day period be a period of
perfection rather than a relation-back period. If for no other
reason, the interest should be treated as being perfected for twenty-
one days because subsections 9-304(4) and (5) state expressly
that it shall be "perfected," and the consequences of perfection
under the Code should be given the interest during that period
whether or not it is subsequently perfected within the twenty-one
days by filing or possession.'0 7
Where the secured party relies upon subsection 9-304(4) as the
basis of his perfection of a security interest in instruments or
negotiable documents, there is also a question, particularly with
reference to documents, whether the perfection will continue for
twenty-one days in all circumstances. Of course, the secured party
perfected immediately before bankruptcy, § 60 (a) (2), and the transfer would
be for an antecedent debt.
"', This is the result indicated by G.S. § 25-9-301(2) (limited effect
ten-day relation-back for purchase-money security interests) in the only
situation where the official comments refer expressly to any type of relation-
back period.
... See G.S. § 25-9-301; G.S. § 25-9-303, comment 2.
10.3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 60.51A at 1050.4 (14th ed. 1964).
107 G.S. § 25-9-301(2) and G.S. § 25-9-303, comment 2, inferentially
support the conclusion as well. But see the second sentence of G.S. § 25-9-
304, comment 4.
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taking an interest in negotiable documents is primarily interested in
having a security interest in the goods that are represented by the
documents, and this is what he gets. When he takes his security
interest under section 9-304(4), his interest in the document and
the goods that it represents is unquestionably perfected for so long
as the document is outstanding. However, a question is presented
where, during the twenty-one-day period, the document is given up
by the debtor in exchange for the goods. Does the secured party
then have a perfected security interest in the "goods" for the un-
used portion of the twenty-one-day period? The answer is not clear.
The official comments were apparently written under the assumption
that the security interest remains perfected until the expiration of
the period without regard to whether the document may have been
converted into goods during the perfection period. 0 s Whether such
an assumption is justified by the actual wording of section 9-304
remains to be seen. In this context, subsection 9-304(4) provides
only for perfection of a security interest in "negotiable documents."
To reach the conclusion desired by the secured party, this will have
to be interpreted to read: "negotiable documents or goods when the
document is no more." Subsection 9-304(2) provides that where
goods are in the possession of someone who has issued a negotiable
document therefor, "a security interest in goods is perfected by
perfecting a security interest in the document . . . ." If that sub-
section said no more, it might be inferred that a security interest
in the negotiable document is the exact equivalent of a security
interest in the goods. But prefatory words of subsection 9-304(2)
seem pretty clearly to say that perfection of a security interest in
the goods by perfecting the interest in documents lasts only "during
the period that the goods are in the possession of the issuer" of
the document. Thus, it would not be unreasonable for a court to
conclude that the temporary perfection terminated at the time that
the debtor took possession of the goods from the issuer of the
document, or at most ten days thereafter." 9
If, in similar situations, the documents are released by the se-
cured party under subsection 9-304(5) for the specified purposes, the
secured party faces less uncertain statutory language and probably
108 E.g., G.S. § 25-9-303, comment 2.
10' Possibly the secured party would be successful in contending that the
goods were "proceeds" of the document within the meaning of G.S. §
25-9-306(1), and thereby gain the ten-day automatic perfection for the se-
curity interest in proceeds. See infra, pp. 808-10.
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should be successful in contending that the security interest should
remain perfected for the complete twenty-one-day period without
regard to the time at which the document is surrendered in return
for the goods. The express purposes for which the release of the
documents is permitted under the subsection-loading, unloading,
storing, shipping, manufacturing, etc.-contemplate that the debtor
will, during the twenty-one-day period convert the document into
goods. Otherwise, he would not be able to accomplish many of the
purposes for which the release is made. Furthermore, the first
sentence refers merely to a "security interest" being perfected for
the twenty-one days, not, as does subsection (4), of a security
interest in specific things, such as negotiable documents. And, since
there is a security interest in both the goods and the documents,
the secured party should have the benefit of perfection under sub-
section (5) for the full twenty-one days. Otherwise, the subsection
would make little sense.
However, in these situations as in other places where a similar
question may arise about the automatic perfection, the advice for
the secured party is to file a financing statement, if he desires to be
certain of the maximum allowable protection under the Code. In
the documents situation, since the secured party will undoubtedly
have a security interest in both the documents and the goods, he
can file as soon after taking his interest as he thinks the documents
will be exchanged by the debtor for the goods. The security inter-
est will then be perfected permanently both as to the documents
and as to any goods covered by the financing statement.
If the secured party releases instruments under either of the
twenty-one-day perfection subsections, he will almost certainly take
the risk that the instrument will be converted by collection into its
proceeds during that period and his "perfection" cut short. Thus,
if the debtor collects the instrument on the first day after possession
has been released to him by the secured party, the security interest
in the instrument will cease to exist because the instrument, in any
meaningful sense, ceases to exist. With the "proceeds" in the hands
of the debtor, the secured party's term of "perfection" will prob-
ably shrink to a maximum of ten additional days under the pro-
vision applicable to proceeds specifically.110 Filing, in this circum-
stance, is of no practical assistance to the secured party, as it will
110 G.S. § 25-9-306 (3).
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not result in perfection of his security interest in original instru-
ments"' and would result in perfection of his interest in the
proceeds only if the character of the proceeds was such that an
interest therein could be perfected by filing." 2
In summary, the temporary perfection permitted by subsections
9-304(4) and (5) may have such a low potential priority and be
attended with so many risks that its use will be discouraged. In
any event, reliance upon this type of "perfection" should be made
only by one familiar with its limitations.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF "PERFECTION"-
PRIORITIES
Subject to exceptions in the case of transactions covered by the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act,"' at the present time it can be stated
that generally in North Carolina the rights of all subsequent parties
who claim to have an interest in personal property superior to that
of the holder of a security interest, except the rights of a bona
fide purchaser in the ordinary course of business, will be determined
on the same basis-whether the secured party took the steps neces-
sary for perfection before the intervention of the subsequent party's
interest. Under Article 9 of the Code, such a general statement is
subject to so many exceptions that it would be virtually meaning-
less. The Code treats separately (although not always with different
results) the problems of priority between the security interest, and
the purchaser in general," 4 buyers in the ordinary course of busi-
" G.S. § 25-9-304(1).
112 G.S. § 25-9-306(3) provides for two methods of perfection beyond
ten days of a security interest in "proceeds": First, if there is a filed financ-
ing statement covering the original collateral that also covers proceeds, the
interest in proceeds will be perfected. Second, the secured party may per-
fect by perfecting a security interest in "the proceeds." If the debtor re-
ceived, in return for the surrender of the instrument, tangible personal
property or an account the secured party could probably perfect his interest
in the "proceeds" under G.S. § 25-9-306(3)(b) by filing, a permissible
method of perfection for that type of collateral. But if the proceeds are
themselves instruments or cash, it would seem that filing would not perfect
an interest in "the proceeds" any more than it would if the instruments or
cash were not proceeds. See text accompanying notes 224-27 infra.
" N.C. GFN. STAT. §§ 45-46 to -66 (Supp. 1965), repealed, effective
July 1, 1967, G.S. § 25-10-102.
114 G.S. § 25-9-301(1) (b), (c). Other special classes of purchasers are
dealt with in G.S. §§ 25-9-308, -309, -307(2).
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ness,"r5 lien creditors,"' other consensual security interests,"1 and
nonconsensual mechanic's or artisan's liens."' Generally, the results
that might be expected in these situations will prevail under the
Code as well. However, there are enough significant differences
between existing results and results under the Code to require close
analysis of the Code provisions.
By way of general introduction, the priorities between the se-
cured party and lien creditors and purchasers will be determined
by the time of "perfection" of the interest, whereas priorities be-
tween consensual security interests will be determined by time of
filing or time of perfection," 9 or other special rules. 20 Thus, an
attorney should never expect that, because he has created a security
interest that will be secure against the lien creditor, he necessarily
has an interest good against other types of interests.
I. THE PRIORITY OF THE LIEN CREDITOR
One significant change from prior law should be noted at the
outset. North Carolina has been a pure "race" jurisdiction in the
matter of priorities where public recordation of interest is required.
Therefore, the knowledge that a person might acquire prior to the
acquisition of his own interest in the property is of no significance
in determining the priorities under the recording acts-the first
interest recorded is prior to the later perfected interest.' 2 ' At least
insofar as the ability of a lien creditor to acquire priority over an
unperfected security interest is concerned, the Code will partially
convert North Carolina into what has been referred to as a "notice"
jurisdiction, 2' and the lien creditor will not be able to acquire
priority over the unperfected security interest if he has knowledge
of its existence at the time he acquires his lien. 28
116 G.S. § 25-9-307(1).
116 G.S. § 25-9-301(1) (b).
117 G.S. § 25-9-312. Some other special rules on priority are contained
in G.S. §§ 25-9-313 (fixtures), -314 (accessions), -315 (commingled and
processed goods).
118 G.S. § 25-9-310.
119 G.S. § 25-9-312(3).
"'0E.g., G.S. § 25-9-312(3), (4) (purchase-money security interest);
G.S. § 25-9-312(2).121 The cases are numerous. E.g., Smith v. Turnage-Winslow Co., 212
N.C. 310, 193 S.E. 685 (1937) (dictum); North State Piano Co. v. Spruill
& Bros., 150 N.C. 168, 63 S.E. 723 (1909).
12 CASNER & LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 783 (1950).
122 G.S. § 25-9-301(1) (b). In some circumstances, knowledge of certain
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The keys to ascertaining the priority of the lien creditor are
the time of the acquisition of the lien and the time of perfection
of the security interest. The lien of judgment on personal property
arises at the time of the attachment or levy," 4 that is, at the time
that the sheriff or levying officer takes actual or constructive posses-
sion of the property. 25 If the lien creditor under the Code acquires
his lien "without knowledge of the security interest and before it
is perfected," he will take priority over the security interest. More
precisely, a person who becomes a lien creditor at a time when the
security interest is unperfected will have priority. There is a possi-
bility under Article 9, where more than one method of perfection
may have been used in any given transaction, that the security
interest will have been perfected by possession and subsequently,
after possession has been relinquished, by late filing so that a gap
would exist during which the security interest was not perfected.
If the lien creditor's interest arises and attaches within that gap,
the lien creditor should have priority even though the security inter-
est was originally perfected "before" the lien creditor's rights at-
tached.'2
6
A lien creditor is defined by section 9-301 to include not only
the creditor for whose benefit the property has been levied upon,
but the assignee for benefit of creditors, a receiver appointed by a
court of equity, and the trustee in bankruptcy. The latter, of course,
does not acquire his status by sufferance of state law and would in
any event have the status of a lien creditor by virtue of the pro-
visions of the Bankruptcy Act.'27 In the circumstances where the
debtor is an insolvent and a representative has been appointed to
wind up his affairs, the Code attempts to attribute to the repre-
sentative of the estate, be he a receiver, assignee, or trustee in bank-
ruptcy, the knowledge of all creditors for the purpose of denying
facts is also relevant to priorities of purchasers. G.S. §§ 25-9-301(1) (c), or
-301(1) (d), or -307, -308 and -309. See text accompanying notes 131-79
infra. Where the contest is between two consensual security interests, the
knowledge of the second party is relevant to priorities only in a very
limited context. A defectively filed financing statement is effective against
a person who has actual knowledge of its contents. G.S. § 25-9-401(2).
124 G.S. § 25-9-301(3); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-313 (1953).
"' Starling v. Selma Cotton Mills, 171 N.C. 222, 88 S.E. 242 (1916);
Bland v. Whitfield, 46 N.C. 122, 125 (1853).
12, G.S. § 25-9-303, comment 2.
Bankruptcy Act § 70(c), 30 Stat. 565 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 110(c) (1964).
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priority. 2 " The knowledge of all creditors of the existence of a
security interest can and probably should be imputed to the repre-
sentative of those creditors in an insolvency proceeding that is in-
stituted and sanctioned under state law. However, it is questionable
whether this provision of subsection 9-301(3) will be effective
against the trustee in bankruptcy. The trustee's status as a lien
creditor under subsection 70(c) and his consequent ability to set
aside security interests that are unperfected at the date of bank-
ruptcy do not depend upon the existence of an actual creditor who,
if vested with a lien, could take priority over the security interests. 29
Therefore, in those circuits wherein the above theory of the trustee's
powers is followed, the holder of the unperfected security interest
probably cannot prevail over the trustee by showing that all creditors
have knowledge of the security interest and would themselves be pre-
cluded from taking priority over the security interest. 8
II. THE PRIORITIES OF "BUYERS," "PURCHASERS,"
AND "TRANSFEREES"
This part of the paper is intended to examine the remaining
classes of subsequent parties whose interest in the particular prop-
erty is not a "security interest" but whose rights conflict with those
of a person who holds a "security interest" in the property. In
other words, it basically is concerned with the rights of the secured
party vis-i-vis other persons who are not lien creditors or secured
parties. Because of the broad definition of "purchase" under the
Code' 3' and the intended absence of restriction on its use in sections
9-308 and 9-309, this section of the paper does overlap to some
extent into the area of priorities between secured parties with refer-
ence to interests in chattel paper, instruments, and negotiable docu-
ments.32 However, for security interests in collateral other than
chattel paper, instruments, and negotiable documents, the priorities
128 G.S. § 25-9-301(3).
"' Hoffman v. Cream-O-Products, 180 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1950); 3
COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 70.53 (14th ed. 1964). See In the matter of
Rosenberg Iron & Metal Co., 343 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1965). Contra, Pacific
Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 304 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1962).
..0 Hoffman v. Cream-O-Products, supra note 129; 3 COLLIER, BANK-
RUPT'CY 70.62A 9 (14th ed. 1964). However, the only reported decision
decided under the Uniform Commercial Code is contra. In the matter of
Komfo Prods. Corp., 224 F. Supp. 229 (E.D. Pa. 1965).131Z.S. § 25-1-201(32).
182 See text accompanying notes 174-75 infra.
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between secured parties are covered in section 9-312 and the sections
following; and the rights of the purchaser or buyer under pre-
ceding sections, specifically sections 9-301 and 9-307, are restricted,
explicitly or implicitly, to those persons who are not secured parties.
The paper is here primarily concerned with the latter.
To avoid confusion in reading Article 9 and determining the
rights of the various types of transferees, it helps to keep in mind
the fact that section 9-301 defines the priorities between certain
classes of persons and the unperfected security interest. The other
sections of Part 3, Article 9 that deal with the rights of these
transferees'8 3 detail the priority of the eligible transferees over the
perfected security interest, leaving to rather involved construction
the conclusion that those persons will also have priority over the
unperfected security interest.13 4
A. Purchasers and Transferees Who Have Priority
Over Unperfected Security Interests
Consistent with existing law, which gives to a bona fide pur-
chaser of property an interest superior to that of a prior secured
party who has failed to record or otherwise perfect his interest,"3 5
Article 9 provides that the transferee who is not a secured party'86
of goods, instruments, documents, or chattel paper will have prior-
ity over an unperfected security interest in the property "to the
extent that he gives value and received delivery of the collateral
without knowledge of the security interest . . . .,, Of course, if
the transferee acquired knowledge or the security interest is per-
fected before he accepts complete delivery of the property or before
Specifically, G.S. §§ 25-9-307. -308, -309.
G.S. § 25-9-312(1); G.S. § 25-9-301(1) (a), comment 2.
... E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-20 (Supp. 1965).
... The wording of the section is "a person who is not a secured party
and who is a transferee in bulk or other buyer not in the ordinary course
of business.. ." G.S. § 25-9-301(1) (c). In conjunction with other sections,
this round-about language means that any purchaser who buys absolute
ownership in the property without knowledge of the unperfected security
interest will prevail. If the purchaser can also qualify as a "buyer in the
ordinary course of business," G.S. 25-1-201(9), he will be in an even better
position. G.S. § 25-9-307(1). See text accompanying notes 147-54 infra. If
the purchaser "buys" only a "security interest," G.S. § 25-1-201(37) in the
property, his right to priority, if any, will be governed by § 9-312.
I" G.S. § 25-9-301(1) (c). Here, as in the case of the lien creditor, the
requirement that the transferee be without knowledge of the security ifiterest
will change North Carolina law. See notes 121-23 supra.
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he has given full value, he will have priority over the security
interest only to the extent that either of the required acts has been
performed.' 3" Determining the extent to which the transferee has
accepted delivery will present few problems as it is an easily mea-
sureable physical fact. Neither should determining the extent to
which value is given present any difficult problems in this context.
Clearly, the extent-of-value provision is not intended to open the
door to a measuring of the economic value of the consideration
given against the economic value of what was received by the
transferee.139 The context assumes some type of sales transaction
and, in such a situation, "value" is given "by accepting delivery
pursuant to a preexisting contract for purchase."O4 Thus, since
both delivery and value are required under subsection 9-301 (1) (b),
the extent of the transferee's rights is determined by the extent
of delivery, if there is a contract for purchase. If delivery has
been made and there is no obligation on the transferee, the trans-
feree will have given no value.
The Code provisions relating to rights of purchasers generally
of accounts, contract rights and general intangibles are less complex
than those for the "tangible" types of collateral. There are no
problems of ostensible ownership or negotiability to make desirable
special exceptions in favor of special classes of purchasers of these
types of collateral. Consequently, the purchaser of the accounts
can find his priority under either section 9-312 or section 9-301. The
latter section defines, as in the case of tangible classes of collateral,
the rights of purchasers other than secured parties over unperfected
security interests in the collateral. The transferee will have pri-
ority if he is "a person who is not a secured party and who is a
transferee to the extent that he gives value without knowledge of
the security interest and before it is perfected."''
However, with relation to accounts, contract rights, and chattel
paper, the author can conceive of no commercially significant situa-
288 G.S. § 25-9-301, comment 4.
. This is a function more appropriately reserved for legislation such as
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-15 (1950) (fraudulent conveyances) and the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyances Act. Aside from that, "value" is a word of art,
defined in G.S. § 25-1-201(44).
1 0 G.S. § 25-1-201(44) (c). Value is given for rights if the rights are
acquired (1) in return for binding commitment to extend credit, (2) in
satisfaction of preexisting claim, (3) accepting delivery, etc., or (4) in
return for consideration sufficient to support a simple contract.
1' G.S. § 25-9-301(1) (d). (Emphasis added.)
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tion in which the transferee thereof would not, under Article 9,
be a "secured party," thus casting in doubt whether subsections
9-301 (c) and (d) in reality have much significance in relation to
the transfers of interests in these types of collateral. It is the
purpose of Article 9 to govern any "sale of accounts, contract
rights, or chattel paper. 1 4 2 To accomplish this purpose, "security
interest" is defined to include "any interest of a buyer of accounts,
chattel paper, or contract rights which is subject to Article 9."143
Thus, it would seem that any commercial purchaser of accounts,
contract rights, or chattel paper would be the holder of a "security
interest" under Article 9. "Secured party" is defined as any person
"in whose favor there is a security interest, including a person to
whom accounts, contract rights or chattel paper have been sold.' 144
Therefore, the transferee of these three classes of collateral, whether
he takes by "sale" or as security, is probably going to be deemed
a "secured party" under subsections 9-301 (c) and (d). As a result,
he would be excluded from these sections and his priority over the
unperfected security interest would come, if at all, by virtue of
section 9-312, or possibly, where chattel paper is the collateral, sec-
tion 9-308. The transferee, who becomes such otherwise than by
gift or some other transfer not by sale or for security, will have an
interest generally subject to Article 9 and will have priority over
the security interest unperfected at the time he gave value only if
he (the transferee) files or otherwise perfects first. If the collateral
is chattel paper, the transferee would perfect the transfer by taking
possession of it; if it is accounts and contract rights, the transferee
would have to perfect by filing'45 first.' 46 However, nothing here
G.S. § 25-9-102(1) (b).
'"G.S. § 25-1-201(37).1
"'G.S. § 25-9-105(1)(i).
1'5 Or by bringing the transfer within the automatic perfection of G.S.§ 25-9-302(1) (e).
... Thus, in the case of chattel paper, it would make no difference in the
ultimate result whether the transfer claimed under G.S. § 25-9-301(1) (c) or
G.S. § 25-9-312. Under the former section, read literally, the transferee
would have priority to the extent he took delivery. Under G.S. § 25-9-312
the result would be the same. The transferee's interest was perfected at the
time he took possession, G.S. § 25-9-305; the perfection was otherwise than
by filing and the first-to-perfect rule, G.S. § 25-9-312(5) (b) would apply
giving him priority. If the original security interest was "perfected," the
transferee or purchaser might also prevail under the special rules of G.S.§ 25-9-308.
Whether the result would be different where accounts or contract rights
are involved depends upon the meaning of "transferee," a term not defined
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said could affect the operations of subsections 9-301(c) and (d)
on the other types of collateral respectively included therein.
B. Purchasers Who Take Priority Over Perfected
Security Interests
In certain circumstances under the Uniform Commercial Code,
some types of purchasers of some types of collateral will take prior-
ity over a perfected as well as an unperfected security interest. The
situations to which this priority is assigned are determined on the
basis that either the status of the purchaser, the actions of the
secured party, or the method of perfection dictates that the secured
party should derive a limited protection from perfection. The un-
derlying reasons for the individual instances are much better seen
in direct relation to the exceptions created.
1. The Buyer in the Ordinary Course of Business.-A pur-
chaser who can bring himself within the definition of "buyer in
the ordinary course of business"14 will take priority over the secur-
ity interest in the property created by his vendor. 48 Thus, Article
9 makes positive law a result that the courts, over the years, have
grappled for, often with diverse and diffuse results, using theories
of waiver or estoppel and other theories equally inappropriate or
inefficient. 149  Concern for delicate balancing of the "property
rights" of the secured party and the equities inherent in the position
of the lowly consumer prevented the judicial process from ever
achieving a satisfactory, reliable rule upon which actions could be
based in this area.
In three instances the North Carolina legislature has in past
years, by design or by inadvertance, sanctioned rules intended to
achieve essentially the same results as will be obtained when the
Code becomes effective.' 5° However, these past legislative attempts
added not sense but more inconsistency to the general law on the
by the Code. If it means a person with a "perfected" interest, the result
under either G.S. § 25-9-301 or G.S. § 25-9-312 would be the same. If it
means simply a person to whom rights have been transfered, the result
would be different.
"
7 As defined in G.S. § 25-1-201(9).
1 43G.S. § 25-9-307(1).
149 See e.g., Atlantic Discount Corp. v. Young, 224 N.C. 89, 29 S.E.2d
29 (1944); Southern Ry. Co. v. W. A. Simpkins Co., 178 N.C. 273, 100
S.E. 418 (1919).
1  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-54 (Supp. 1965) (Uniform Trust Receipts Act),
repealed effective July 1, 1967, G.S. § 25-10-102; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-73
(Supp. 1965) (Factor's Lien Act), repealed effective July 1, 1967, G.S. §
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subject. After the final legislative solution antedating the adoption
of Uniform Commercial Code was enacted in 1961, the consumer
who purchased goods from a merchant could take free of a security
interest created by the merchant if the security interest was cast
in the form of the trust receipt."5' In an identical situation, substi-
tuting a chattel mortgage for the trust receipt, the consumer would
lose; but if he purchased an automobile as opposed to a refrigerator,
he would win in both situations. 52 In place of such nonsensical
distinctions is substituted the Code rule that the buyer in the ordi-
nary course of business of any type of "goods" that may be subject
to any type of security interest will take priority over the perfected
or unperfected interest of the secured party. The buyer's knowledge
of the existence of the security interest is relevant only where he
not only knows'5 3 of the existence of the interest, but also knows
that specific provisions of the security agreement prohibited sale by
the debtor in the situation.' In the typical consumer-sales situa-
tion, knowledge will seldom, if ever, be a factor in determining
priority unless the secured party stands at the door and presents
to every customer a copy of the security agreement with the pro-
visions prohibiting sale underlined in red. The average consumer
may suspect that the retailer is being financed by a third party who
has a security interest in the goods, but it is unlikely that the con-
sumer knows even this fact; much less does he "know" of the
specific provisions of the security agreement prohibiting sale. Thus,
the consumer's expectations will be met under the Code by giving
him a title free of the interest of the secured party. It should be
noted that the priority of the buyer in the ordinary course of business
is not limited to sales of consumer goods. It should apply to any
situation in which the seller is regularly engaged in the business of
selling the type of goods involved, except where the purchaser buys
farm products from a farmer. However, as the level of sophistica-
tion of the buyer rises and the frequency of sales of the type of
items decreases, there is greater likelihood that the buyer may have
25-10-102; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-58.9 (Supp. 1965) (purchaser of auto-
mobile from dealer).
... N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-54(b) (1) (Supp. 1965), repealed effective July
1, 1967, G.S. § 25-10-102.
... N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-58.9(3) (Supp. 1965).
'~ "A person knows or has knowledge of a fact when he has actual
knowledge of it." G.S. § 25-1-201(25).
""' G.S. § 25-9-307, comment 2; G.S. § 25-1-201(9).
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knowledge of facts which will prevent him from taking priority
over the security interest. Nevertheless, actual knowledge is still
the requirement, not merely knowledge of facts sufficient to put a
reasonable man on inquiry.
Casual examination of subsection 9-307(2) would lead one to
the conclusion that the section is designed to protect the buyer of
the goods only in the situation where the perfected security interest
antedates the purchase, that is, it contemplates only a situation
where there will be a security interest in the inventory at the time
that the buyer purchases. Not so, said a Pennsylvania court in
Weisel v. McBride,'55 where the purchaser of an automobile left
the forms by which the certificate of title could be procured with
the seller upon the seller's representation that he would procure the
title for the buyer. Seller instead procured the certificate of title in
his own name and on the basis of this certificate procured an ad-
vance from the plaintiff who took a security interest in the auto-
mobile from the seller. The court implicitly found this to be a
"security interest created by his seller" and, therefore, held that
the buyer had priority.
2. Purchasers of Chattel Paper, Instruments and Negotiable
Instruments.-Chattel paper, instruments, and negotiable docu-
ments are subject to some special rules of priority where the rights
of a purchaser or holder are in conflict with the rights of a prior
secured party who has a perfected security interest therein. 5 The
effect of these special rules is to modify what would otherwise be
the anticipated results between secured parties under section 9-312.
As heretofore noted, the Code permits the perfection of a secur-
ity interest in chattel paper by filing a financial statement or'by the
secured party's taking possession of the paper.'5 Where filing is
the method of perfection chosen by the original secured party, per-
fection will be less than complete protection against the intervening
rights of some third parties. The secured party, by permitting the
debtor to remain in possession of the chattel paper and collect the
debts represented by it, will effectively subordinate his perfected
security interest to the rights of a purchaser of the paper who gives
new value and takes possession of the paper in the ordinary course
... 191 Pa. Super. 411, 156 A.2d 613 (1959).
'"" G.S. § 25-9-308 (chattel paper and non-negotiable instruments); G.S.§ 25-9-309 (negotiable instruments and documents and "securities").
15 G.S. § 25-9-305.
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of his business without knowledge of the prior security interest."5
Knowledge again means actual knowledge of the purchaser with
reference to the specific paper he is purchasing;"69 the constructive
notice imputed by the filed financing statement will not be sufficient
to deprive the purchaser of his priority. The ordinary course of
business here relevant is the ordinary course of the transferee's
business, 60 not, as in the case of buyers of goods,' the ordinary
course of business of the transferor.
A "purchaser" in this context is a person who takes "by sale,
discount, ... mortgage, pledge, lien, ...gift or any other volun-
tary transaction creating an interest in property."' 2 Of course, the
requirement of giving "new value" and taking possession in the
ordinary course of business would exclude the lien creditor, a donee
and other noncommercial transferees from the benefits of this sec-
tion.
Chattel paper is subject to yet another exception. Since it is
nearly always the end result of a sale from inventory, chattel paper
is "proceeds" under subsection 9-306(1). The last sentence of sec-
tion 9-308 provides that a purchaser of chattel paper who gives
new value and takes possession of it in the ordinary course of his
business has priority over the security interest in the chattel paper
that is claimed merely as a result of the fact that this chattel paper
is proceeds. More significantly, such a purchaser will take priority
even though he has knowledge that the paper that he purchases is
subject to the competing perfected interest of the secured party.
The obvious intended effect of this provision is to prevent the sup-
plier or financier of a merchant from acquiring an automatic
monopoly on the chattel paper of that merchant that results from
the sale of the inventory in which the supplier or financier had a
1' G.S. § 25-9-308. If this section were not included in Article 9, the
transfers included in it would be governed by G.S. 25-9-312 as they would
be contests between "secured parties." See text accompanying notes 142-46
supra. The first secured party perfected by filing and the second perfected
by possession. The second rule of G.S. § 25-9-312(5) would give priority
to the first secured party as he was the first to perfect. This, of course,
assumes that the first secured party had a perfected interest, not merely a
filed financing statement.
'so G.S. § 25-9-308; G.S. § 25-1-201(25).100 G.S. § 25-9-308.
101 G.S. § 25-9-307(1).
102 G.S. § 25-1-201(32), (33). Purchase also includes taking by "negotia-
tion" and "issue of re-issue," terms not applicable to any transfer of chattel
paper.
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security interest. In other words, the mere acquisition of inventory
through the financing of one secured party will not prevent the
merchant from retaining bargaining position in relation to chattel
paper that is proceeds of the inventory. The merchant has the op-
tion at the completion of a sale from inventory that gives rise to
chattel paper to retain the paper in which case it will remain subject
to the security interest, or to sell the chattel paper to some third
party. If the original inventory financier wishes to deny to the
merchant this option by foreclosing the rights of the purchaser who
has knowledge of the security interest, he can bargain with the
merchant for a security interest in the chattel paper separately, in-
cluding in the agreement an after-acquired property clause. When
the secured party gives value for the chattel paper separately and
the security interest attaches, the secured party can file and have
protection against all purchasers except those claiming under the
first sentence of section 9-308, or he can file and take possession of
the paper and have complete protection.6
As in the case of chattel paper, a purchaser of a non-negotiable
instrument other than a security6 "who gives new value and takes
possession of it in the ordinary course of his business and without
knowledge that the specific . . . instrument is subject to a security
interest,"' 65 will have priority over the perfected security interest.
However, filing is not a permissible method of perfection of a secur-
ity interest in instruments. 66 Consequently, the only situation
where this provision would be applicable would be where the debtor
had possession of the non-negotiable instrument and the secured
party claimed temporary perfection under subsections 9-304(4) or
(5) .167 Although a non-negotiable instrument might be "pro-
ceeds"'68 of collateral in which a person had a perfected security
interest, thereby giving him a ten-day perfection of the security
interest in the proceeds' 6 9-the instrument-the Code makes no
express provision for the rights of a purchaser who claims adversely
to the secured party's "perfected" interest in that situation. How-
... See generally, 1 COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS § 7.09(3) (b).
"'4 The purchaser of a "security," whether or not it is negotiable, is pro-
tected, if at all, under G.S. § 25-9-309.
100 G.S. § 25-9-308.
"00 G.S. § 25-9-304(1).
10. G.S. § 25-9-308, comment 3.
208 G.S. § 25-9-306(1).
109 G.S. § 25-9-306(3).
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ever, since the proceeds perfection in that situation, like the twenty-
one-day perfection, in nonpossessory, there would be little reason
to depart from the rule of section 9-308 permitting the unknowing
purchaser who gives new value to have priority.170
Probably because non-negotiable instruments alone are not a
significant source of commercial financing and not often proceeds,
the last sentence of section 9-308, which broadens the rights of
purchasers of chattel paper where it is claimed as proceeds, is not
applicable to non-negotiable instruments.
Any time a secured party is claiming a nonpossessory perfected
security interest in a negotiable instrument, a negotiable document,
or a security,' 7' his rights can be cut off by a transferee of the
particular collateral who is in a position to cut off claims of owner-
ship generally.' 7 2 Any other, more restrictive rule would have a
broad adverse effect on the negotiability or transferability of these
instruments and documents, a result that would in no way be justi-
fied solely on the ground of protection of the secured party's non-
possessory perfection.
The situations in which the subsequent purchaser will cut off the
secured party's interest depend, of course, upon the formalities re-
quired for the purchaser to become a holder in due course of the
negotiable instrument, one to whom a negotiable document has been
duly negotiated, or a bona fide purchaser of a security.17 Generally,
taking the instrument, document, or security as security for or in
payment of a new advance or an antecedent debt will not preclude
one, otherwise qualified, from acquiring the ability to cut off the
110 The secured party should then have a perfected security interest in
the "proceeds" of the "proceeds." G.S. § 25-9-306.
""' This will normally be where these documents have been released to
the debtor under G.S. § 25-9-304(4) or (5), although, conceivably, it could
be where he claims the perfected security interest in proceeds. G.S. §
25-9-306.
112 G.S. § 25-9-309.
t To become a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument a pur-
chaser must first become a "holder." G.S. § 25-3-302(1), which requires
that order paper be indorsed to him or in blank and delivered; bearer paper
need only to be delivered. G.S. § 25-1-201(20).
The negotiable document is "negotiated" in essentially the same manner
as a negotiable instrument. G.S. § 25-7-501.
"A 'bona fide purchaser' is a purchaser for value in good faith and
without notice of any adverse claim who takes delivery of a security in
bearer form or of one in registered form issued to him or indorsed to him
or in blank." G.S. 25-8-302.
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claims of ownership or adverse interest. 7 4 Therefore, the subse-
quent holder in due course or bona fide purchaser, even though he
acquires only a security interest in the collateral, will take priority
over the rights of the secured party having the temporarily per-
fected interest.
7 5
The fact that absence of notice of adverse claim is a prerequisite
to a transferee's claim of priority under section 9-309'76 raises the
question whether the secured party, when releasing the instruments
or documents to the debtor, can in any way protect himself from
parties who claim under section 9-309. It would seem that the
secured party could stamp or otherwise clearly note on the face of
the paper the fact that he claims a security interest in the paper
and thereby preclude any subsequent purchaser from taking free of
his interest."' 7 If so, this could possibly create an anomalous situa-
tion. For example, assume the release of commercial paper. For
twenty-one days after release of the instrument the secured party
would have a perfected security interest,17' and because of the notice
of the secured party's claim written on the paper, no purchaser
could become a holder in due course. After twenty-one days the
secured party's security interest would become unperfected and,
while no purchaser could become a holder in due course, a subse-
quent pledgee or other secured party perfecting his security interest
by taking possession would prevail over the first secured party under
subsection 9-312(5) (a)." If there is a firm answer to this prob-
lem, it escapes the author.
:" G.S. § 25-3-303(b) (negotiable instrument) (by implication). Com-
pare G.S. § 25-8-302 (bona fide purchaser of security), with G.S. § 25-1-
201(32) ("purchase" defined), and G.S. § 25-1-201(44) (b) ("value" de-
fined).
However, a negotiable document is not "duly negotiated" when it is
taken in "settlement or payment of a money obligation." UCC § 7-501(4),
comment 1.
... This situation brings G.S. § 25-9-309 into intended conflict with the
rules of priority between secured parties, G.S. § 25-9-312. Whether or not
the transferee is a "secured party," if he qualifies under this section, he wil
take priority over the first perfected security interest, G.S. § 25-9-312(1).
18 To become a holder in due course, bona fide purchaser or one to whom
a document has been duly negotiated, the purchaser must take without
notice of any adverse claim. G.S. §9 25-3-302(1)(c), -8-302, -7-501(4).
The permissible filing of security interests in negotiable documents, G.S. §
25-9-304(1), does not constitute "notice" to the purchaser. G.S. § 25-9-309.
... See Mooney, The Old and the New: Article 9, 16 ARK. L. Rsv. 145,
n.13 (1961).G.S. § 25-9-304(5).
1. This is assuming that knowledge of a prior security interest will not
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III. PRIORITIES BETWEEN SECURED PARTIES
Where two persons are owners of consensual security interests
in identical goods, accounts, contract rights, or general intangibles,
the determination of which has priority will basically be made by
application of the rules of section 9-312. If the competing security
interests are in chattel paper, instruments, or documents, the priori-
ties will likewise be governed by section 9-312, except where one
of the secured parties can bring himself and the situation within
one of the previously discussed special rules of sections 9-308 or
9-309.
The basic rules under section 9-312 are set out in subsection
(5) of that section and are generally referred to as (1) the "first-
to-file" rule, (2) the "first-to-perfect" rule, and (3) the "first-to-
attach" rule. They mean exactly what the references imply. If
the first-to-file rule is applicable to a given situation, the party who
first filed his financing statement will have priority, and so on. The
key to determining which of the first two rules is applicable is the
method of perfection of each of the security interests. The first
rule is applicable only where both of the competing interests are
perfected by filing; the second is applicable only where one or both
of the interests are perfected otherwise than by filing. Since Article
9 permits perfection of various security interests by several meth-
ods other than filing and since more than one of these methods may
have been used in a single transaction, the problem arises of decid-
ing which of the methods used shall control the application of the
priority rules. Subsection 9-312(6) provides the answer. The first
method by which the security interest was perfected, if the security
remains continuously perfected, shall determine which of the prior-
ity rules is applicable.
To illustrate, suppose that C Bank took a security interest in
some goods covered by negotiable documents. The bank must
originally perfect its security interest in the goods by perfecting
an interest in the documents. The security interest in the docu-
ment may be perfected in any of three ways: (1) by filing,'
prevent the perfected security interest from taking priority over the unper-
fected one. Knowledge is expressly a factor in determining priorities of
purchasers not secured parties and lien creditors. G.S. § 25-9-301. However,
the lack of knowledge requirement is conspicuously absent from G.S. §
25-9-312(5) (b), which would govern the priorities between the two "secured
parties."
160G.S. § 25-9-304(1).
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(2) by taking possession after the security interest attaches,181 or
(3) by claiming a temporary perfection and permitting the docu-
ments to remain in or releasing them to the debtor's possession. 8
Assuming that the bank chose the first method and filed a financing
statement covering the documents and goods before it made an
advance, the bank's interest would, so long as it remained con-
tinuously perfected, be deemed to be perfected by filing. This would
be so even though the bank subsequently took possession of the
document or the goods.
If the bank chose to perfect by taking possession initially, but
several days later filed a financing statement and released the docu-
ments and goods to the debtor, the bank's interest would be deemed
perfected otherwise than by filing. The same would be true if the
bank initially relied upon the twenty-one-day temporary perfection,
and before the debtor converted the document into goods in his
possession, the bank filed a financing statement; the bank would be
deemed to have perfected otherwise than by filing. However, if
at any time there was a period during which the security interest
was not perfected-for example, if the bank failed to file until
twenty-two days after the documents were released to the debtor-
not only would the bank's time of perfection date from the twenty-
second day, but the method of perfection taken on that day would
control the operation of the priority rules thereafter.
Having identified the method of perfection of each security
interest, the application of the priority rules is relatively simple.
A. The First-To-File Rule88
Simply stated, the rule is: Where both competing security inter-
ests are or are deemed to be perfected by filing, the security interest
related to the first filed financing statement shall have priority. The
first secured party to procure the debtor's name on a financing state-
ment and file the statement will have priority over any subsequently
filed security interests. The relative times of attachment and per-
fection of the security interests, where this rule is applicable, are
irrelevant. Therefore, at the time of filing of the first financing
statement, the secured party need not make an advance, nor need
there be a security agreement in existence at that time.
1' G.S. § 25-9-305.
182 G.S. § 25-9-304(4) or (5).
83 G.S.§ 25-9-312(5) (a).
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To be extreme in example, suppose that on January 1, 1963, A
files a financing statement adequately describing all of the equip-
ment used in debtor's business. No security agreement is executed
and A does not make any advance at that time. On January 1,
1965, B loans the debtor 100,000 dollars, taking a security interest
in the debtor's equipment. The same day B files a financing state-
ment covering the transaction. On June 1, 1965, A finally loans the
debtor 50,000 dollars and a security agreement covering the equip-
ment is executed. In a contest for the equipment between A and
B, A would have priority. Both security interests having been per-
fected by filing, the first-to-file a financing statement prevails.
Standing alone, the first-to-file rule may appear to give to the
first filer unwarranted ability to tie up the assets of a debtor. How-
ever, on the facts given above, there are methods by which B could
have insured himself priority over the subsequent advance made by
A.
First,"8 4 B, having notice of the first filing, could have required
the debtor to procure a termination statement from A. When no
secured obligation is outstanding against a filed financing statement,
the secured party is obligated, upon written demand of the debtor,
to provide a statement, which when filed will terminate the effec-
tiveness of the original financing statement.'85 Thus, B could have
procured termination of the original filing and its own filing would
have been first.
Second, B could have originally perfected its security interest
otherwise than by filing, in which case the first-to-file rule would
not have applied. For example, B could have initially perfected by
taking possession of the collateral and subsequently released it to
the debtor after filing a financing statement. The first-to-perfect
rule would then govern priorities.
... These observations are by no means original with the author. See
generally 1 COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS § 7.05. Other possibilities, which re-
quire the acquiescence of the first secured party, are a subordination agree-
ment, G.S. § 25-9-316, or an agreement procuring release of collateral. G.S.
§ 25-9-406.
165 G.S. § 25-9-404(1). If the secured party fails to comply within ten
days with a proper request for termination statement, he becomes obligated
to pay to the debtor one hundred dollars plus any other damages the debtor
suffers as a result of the failure to comply.
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B. The First-To-Perfect Rule86
If either or both of the competing security interests are or are
deemed perfected otherwise than by filing, the first security interest
perfected shall have priority. Therefore, any time one of the com-
peting security interests was originally perfected otherwise than by
filing-by the secured party's taking possession or by one of the
automatic or temporary types of perfection-and has remained con-
tinuously perfected, priority will be awarded to the security interest
that first achieved the "perfected" status. A security interest can
become perfected only concurrently with or subsequent to the time
of attachment, that is, the time at which (1) the secured party
gives value, (2) there is an agreement that the interest shall attach,
and (3) the debtor acquires rights in the collateral.' 7
In the example given, assuming that B had initially perfected
by taking possession of the collateral, B would be entitled to pri-
ority under the first-to-perfect rule. At the time B acquired his
perfected security interest, A had not given value and there was
no agreement that the security interest attach. A's security interest
did not become perfected until June 1, 1965.
C. The First-To-Attach Rule'
In the unlikely event that neither of the competing security
interests has been perfected, priority will be given in the order of
attachment of the security interests.
D. The Future Advances Problem
Closely related the the operation of subsection 9-312(5) and other
priority rules is subsection 9-204(5), which validates provisions in
security agreements for obligatory or nonobligatory future advances
-the "open-end mortgage" situation.8 9 Comparison of subsection
9-204(5) with the priority rules raises one of the most discussed
and least resolved problems arising under Article 9. Essentially, the
problem is: Does the inclusion of a future advances provision in a
security agreement confer upon the security interest a priority over
186 G.S. § 25-9-312(5) (b).
'
8
,G.S. § 25-9-204(1).188 G.S. § 25-9-312(5) (c).
188 G.S. § 25-9-204(5) provides: "Obligations covered by a security agree-
ment may include future advances or other value whether or not the ad-
vances or value are given pursuant to commitment."
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all subsequent interests in the property to the extent of advances
made before or after the subsequent interest arises? For example,
suppose that A loans the debtor one hundred dollars on January 1,
1966, taking a security interest in all of the debtor's personal prop-
erty. The security agreement provides that the collateral shall also
secure any advances A might make in the future. A files the security
agreement on the same day. On June 1, 1966, any one of the fol-
lowing things happens: (1) B loans the debtor one hundred dollars,
takes a security interest in debtor's property and files a financing
statement; or (2) C loans the debtor one hundred dollars and takes
a security interest in debtor's refrigerator, which interest C perfects
by taking possession of the refrigerator; or (3) D purchases a
freezer from the debtor, pays 200 dollars cash and takes possession
of the freezer; or (4) E, a judgment creditor of debtor, directs
levy and execution on a gas range belonging to debtor. On June
15, 1966, A loans debtor an additional 10,000 dollars. Which, if
any, of the four subsequent parties have priority over A's security
interest and to what extent?
Two conclusions are clearly dictated by the language of Article
9. First, none of the subsequent parties will have priority over A
with reference to any property necessary to satisfy the one-hundred-
dollar debt outstanding at the time their interests arose. At that
time, A had a fully perfected security interest for one hundred dol-
lars, and the interest was both first filed and first perfected.190
Second, B will not have priority over A for any amount. The
first-to-file rule will confer on A a priority to the extent of any
perfected interest he holds at the time the contest arises, without
regard to the time of perfection.
However, the priority of C, D, or E with reference to any prop-
erty necessary to satisfy A's 10,000-dollar advance is in doubt. All
three of these subsequent interests have one thing in common-
with relation to A, their priority is determined by whether and to
what extent A had a "perfected" security interest at the time their
interests arose.' When A made the one-hundred-dollar advance
on January 1, 1966, coupled with a security agreement and filing,
he acquired a "perfected" security interest to at least the extent
of one hundred dollars. Did he also acquire a "perfected" security
100 G.S. § 25-9-312(5) (a) and (b).
101 G.S. § 25-9-301; G.S. § 25-9-312(5) (b).
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interest as to any other dollars he might in the future choose to
extend to the debtor ?192
It would seem, in relation to the subsequent lien creditor, that
the only reasonable conclusion that can be reached is that A has a
perfected security interest only to the extent of the original one-
hundred-dollar advance until such time as an additional advance is
made. To conclude otherwise would permit the secured party, at
nominal cost, indefinitely to tie up all of the debtor's property
described by the security agreement. A should not be able to pre-
vent attachment by a lien creditor of the debtor's interest in the
property for so long as the one hundred dollars remains unpaid.
Furthermore, section 9-311 expressly provides that the interest of
the debtor is subject to levy and execution. While it could be
argued that the signing of a security agreement with the nonobliga-
tory future-advances provision destroys or suspends the "rights" of
the debtor referred to in section 9-311, it would be ludicrous to
hold that the debtor and one willing creditor, through such an agree-
ment and a one or one-hundred-dollar advance, could effectively
postpone the ability of all other general creditors to satisfy their
claims as long as the advance remains unpaid, a result that would
logically follow from the argument.
The subsequent purchaser of the debtor's property or the subse-
quent secured party who perfects otherwise than by filing are in
somewhat the same position as the lien creditor with respect to
technical analysis of Article 9. However, the considerations that
might dictate a similar result are centered around the debtor rather
than the third party. The purchaser and the secured party have
an option that is often not available to the lien creditor at the
critical time-they can refuse to deal with the debtor who has put
himself in such a position. But, from the point of view of the
debtor, it seems equally unwise to construe the nonobligatory future-
advances provision as suspending all of his rights in the collateral
in this fashion. Section 9-311 is also affirmative in its declaration
that no provision in the security agreement can prevent voluntary
transfer of the debtor's rights by sale or by creation of another
... See generally 1 COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS §§ 4.05, 3.07(3) n.83. M.
Coogan takes the position that two or more security interests are involved
in this type situation. The first security interest is perfected to the extent
of the original value given; the second and following are perfected only as
additional value is given.
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security interest. And, while it might not be unsound policy to de-
clare that the future-advances provision will effectively destroy the
debtor's rights in the collateral in a commercial situation, Article 9
is not applicable only to highly sophisticated commercial transac-
tions. The unsuspecting debtor in the hypothetical situation would
probably be surprised to learn that the security interest given to A
has made his property singularly unattractive to any subsequent pur-
chaser or lender because of the possibility that they would not have
priority over A with reference to any advances that A might decide
to make in the future. It is true that the original secured party could
never actually acquire an interest in the property of greater value
than the amounts that he at some time advances. But that does not
seem to this writer to answer the general objection to comprehen-
sively giving secured parties the ability to cast such a cloud of
uncertainty over the debtor's interest in the property-an interest
that they may never need to satisfy the obligation-and to giving
them the potential ability to tie the debtor to their source of credit
without making any long-term commitment themselves. Further-
more, the first-to-file rule of priority might be very difficult to live
with in general application unless there are some ways other than
purchase-money priority to avoid it in this type of situation.
Therefore, referring again to the hypothetical situation, treat-
ing A's interests in the property as two security interests, the first
perfected for one hundred dollars before the intervention of the
subsequent interests and the second perfected for 10,000 dollars
after the intervention of those interests, the first-to-perfect rule
would give the "perfected" interests of C and D priority over A
with reference to any property not necessary to satisfy the one-
hundred-dollar obligation of the debtor.
But, while this theory may be a step in the right direction and
may be the only such theory that can be applied consistently with
the language and concepts of Article 9, it is conceded that it may
be too long a step away from the legitimate interests of the initial
secured party. When most commercial future-advance provisions
are written, it is contemplated that the future advances will be made
periodically in the normal course of business and such advances
are so made. However, if the advancer is threatened with the possi-
bility of there being a subsequent interest in the property that will
have priority over his advances because it is perfected before the
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interest arising from his advances is perfected, he must, to be cer-
tain that no such interest exists, check the collateral that the debtor
has on hand before making each advance. Moreover, because there
may also be a security interest originally perfected otherwise than by
filing to take advantage of the first-to-perfect rule and subsequently
perfected by filing, the advancer will be required to check the state
of the public record before making each advance. This is probably
too burdensome on the original secured party.
The solution that appears best to compromise the conflicting
considerations and give adequate protection to all concerned parties
is that of permitting the original secured party to have priority
with reference to any advances made prior to the time he has actual
knowledge of the subsequent interest.193 This rule would properly
put the burden of giving notice on the individual subsequent parties;
if the subsequent parties desired to be assured of priority over subse-
quent advances made by the original secured party, they could
easily give written notice to the prior secured parties whose names
appear on the public record. The rule would retain the saleability
of the debtor's interest in the property and relieve the advancer of
laborious inquiry. However, this approach is beset with an internal
problem-there is simply no direct authority for its application
under the terms of Article 9. A court deciding a case similar to
the hypothetical situation would seem to have only the alternative
of accepting or rejecting the two-security-interest approach. If it
is accepted, the case must be decided on the basis of relative times
of perfection, a rule that does not take into account the knowledge
of the secured party at the time subsequent advances were made.
Therefore, if this entire future-advances problem is or becomes of
practical importance-and fairness requires noting that the absence
of reported cases indicates that it may not be a practical problem-
the solution would lie in amendment of Article 9 .193a
... This is the rule adopted by many courts in dealing with the problem
in relation to real estate mortgages. E.g., Oaks v. Weingartner, 105 Cal.
App. 2d 598, 234 P.2d 194 (1951). However, the diversity of judicial
results indicates that the problem has never been one subject to easy solution.
See OSBORNE, MORTGAGES §§ 117-20 (1951).
1
.a The following amendment to UCC § 9-312 was at one time under con-
sideration by the Permanent Editorial Board for the Code:
When a later secured party gives new value and perfects his security
interest in equipment, consumer goods or farm products covered by an
earlier perfected security interest, he has priority over the earlier
security interest as to any advance subsequently made by the holder of
1966]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
IV. SPECIAL PERFECTION AND PRIORITY RULES
Section 9-312 provides for two situations in which a special
priority is given to security interests even though the particular
interests would not have priority by application of the first-to-file
or first-to-perfect rules.
A. The Purchase-Money Security Interest
The North Carolina court has, as have most others, given a
superior protection to the purchase-money security interest." 5 The
purchase-money security interest has generally been held to have
priority over preexisting dower rights, judgment liens, and, most
importantly for personal property,190 the after-acquired property
clause contained in a prior mortgage. The North Carolina court
has held that the purchase-money security interest will prevail over
a previously executed after-acquired property clause even though
the purchase-money security interest is not recorded or otherwise
perfected before the party claims under the prior security agree-
ment.
07
Article 9 continues the basic policy of giving the purchase-money
the earlier security interest unless the subsequent advance or a com-
mitment to make it was made before the holder of the earlier security
interest knew of the new value given by the second secured party, or
was made for the necessary protection, maintenance or preservation of
the collateral or any part thereof.
Quoted from 1 COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS § 7.11[7].
For some unexplained reason this amendment was subsequently dropped
from consideration. Unfortunately, no helpful inference concerning the intent
of the Code provisions as they stand now can be drawn from the fact that
this amendment was considered and rejected. If adopted, the amendment
would have altered the first-to-file rule with respect to security interests in
the types of collateral covered-equipment, consumer goods, and farm products.
But it would have left unchanged the uncertainty concerning security inter-
ests in other types of collateral and the rights of other purchasers and lien
creditors with reference to all types of collateral.
'G.S. § 25-1-201(44) (a). "Value" includes a "binding commitment
to extend credit."
10" For the definition of purchase money security interest see Hanft,
Article Nine: Secured Transactions-Validity, Rights of the Parties; De-
fault, 44 N.C.L. REv. 716, 731 (1966).
100 Dower and the judgment lien are not problems of personal property
purchase-money security interest priority. There is no inchoate dower inter-
est in personal property in this state. The judgment lien, because it does not
arise until levy, note 125 supra, will always be a subsequent, not a pre-
existing interest.
107 Cox v. New Bern Lighting & Fuel Co., 151 N.C. 62, 65 S.E. 648
(1909).
[Vol. 44
1966] SECURED TRANSACTIONS 803
security interest preferred treatment. However, the Code treatment
differs from prior law in two important respects.
The first relates to filing and perfection problems. The Code will
require generally that the purchase-money security interest, to re-
tain priority over conflicting security interest, be perfected within
ten days after the debtor takes possession of the collateral. 9 ' If
the secured party does perfect within the ten-day period, his perfec-
tion relates back to the day the debtor took possession, and he will
have priority over an after-acquired property clause or any security
interest that arose during the ten-day period. Also, the relation
back applies to a limited extent to protect the purchase-money secur-
ity interest from other subsequent interests. If the secured party
files within ten days, he will have priority over a lien creditor or
bulk purchaser whose interest arose during the ten-day period. 9
However, any purchaser not a secured party, lien creditor, or bulk
purchaser will have priority over the purchase-money security inter-
est to the extent he gives value and takes delivery before the pur-
chase-money security interest is perfected.20 0
The second change that the Code will make is of highest impor-
tance to those who finance any type of inventory. The purchase-
money security interest in "inventory"' 0' 1 will not be entitled to
priority over a preexisting after-acquired property clause, unless the
purchase-money secured party (1) gives written notice to the hold-
er of the previously filed conflicting security interest, describing
the items of type of inventory in which he will claim purchase-
money priority, and (2) perfects his own security interest before
the debtor receives possession of the collateral.20 2 Only if these
conditions are complied with will the purchase-money security inter-
est have priority.
From the standpoint of the inventory financer who makes
regular advances against the incoming inventory of a debtor-seller,
198 G.S. § 25-9-312(4); National Cash Register Co. v. Firestone & Co.,
191 N.E.2d 471 (Mass. 1963). Of course, if the purchase-money security
is subject to § 9-312(3), discussed below, it must be perfected at the time
the debtor is given possession of the property.
"00 G.S. § 25-9-301(2).200 G.S. § 25-9-301, comment 5.
201 "Inventory" is goods "held by a person who holds them for sale or
lease or to be furnished under contracts of service or if he has so furnished
them, or if they are raw materials, work in process or materials used or
consumed in business." G.S. § 25-9-109(2).
o.G.S. § 25-9-312(3).
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this section represents a decided advantage over the probable state
of prior law. It severely curtails the ability of the debtor to under-
cut the original security interest by purchasing subject to purchase-
money security interests while at the same time maintaining a
sufficient air of respectability to his primary financer to encourage
continuation of the advances. Under the Code, the primary financer
can be reasonably certain that he will have a security interest prior
to any purchase-money security interest unless he receives written
notice that someone else will be claiming priority with respect to a
particular shipment.20 3
B. The Agricultural Lien on Crops
Basically, the crop lien or mortgage is treated in the Code as
is any other security interest in tangible personal property. With
respect to the validity of the agreement between the parties, the
procedures to be followed upon default, the methods of perfection,
and for the most part the priorities, such a security interest is
identical to a security interest in any other goods. However, there
is one exception that affords preferred treatment to the security
interest taken for new value given to enable the debtor to produce
his crops. This security interest will have priority over a previously
perfected security interest in the same crops to the extent that
(1) the security interest is created "not more than three months
before the crops become growing crops" and is perfected, and (2)
the perfected security interest over which priority is claimed secured
obligations due more than six months before the crops become
growing crops.2 0 4 Since a Code-created security interest cannot at-
tach to crops that become such by planting more than a year from
the date of the security agreement,0 5 the competing interests most
likely to be involved will be the real estate transactions excepted
from the one-year rule by subsection 9-204(4)-the mortgage or
lease on the real estate, which also includes a security interest in
crops.2 " As to amortization or rental payments due less than six
"'He can be only "reasonably certain" because there is some question
whether G.S. § 25-9-312(3), as read literally, applies where the purchase-
money secured party perfects otherwise than by filing. 1 COOGAN, HOGAN &
VAGTS § 7.06, n.89.20
' G.S. § 25-9-312(2).
20" G.S. § 25-9-204(4) (a).
O'The current priority given landlord's lien, which arises by operation
of law, N.C. GN. STAT. § 42-15 (1950), is probably retained under the
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months before the time of planting of the crop, the secured party
under the first perfected agreement will have priority.
C. The Security Interest in Fixtures
Section 9-313 of Article 9 defines the rights of a secured party
holding a security interest in a "fixture" in relation to the rights
of owners of interests in the real estate to which the fixture is
attached. Other than to exclude basic construction materials in-
corporated into the structure, such as "lumber, bricks, tiles, cement,
glass, metal work," etc., the Code offers no definition of "fixture,"
leaving this determination to the other law of the jurisdiction." 7
Briefly summarized, the rules for determining the rights and priori-
ties of the holder of the security interest are as follows:
(1) A security interest that attaches to an item before that item
is affixed to the real estate will have priority over all then-existing
interests in the real estate whether or not the security interest is
perfected. If the security interest is perfected, it will also have
priority over any lien creditor, purchaser, or encumbrancer who
acquires an interest in the real estate after perfection of the security
interest.208
(2) A security interest that attaches to an item after that item
is affixed to the real estate will be inferior to any interest then
existing in the real estate unless the owner of the real estate interest
consents in writing to the security interest or disclaims any interest
in the goods as fixtures. If the security interest is perfected, it
will have priority over any subsequent lien creditor, purchaser or
encumbrancer who acquires an interest in the real estate.2 9
(3) Where, under the above rules, the secured party has priority
over all of the interests in the real estate, he may, upon default,
remove the collateral from the real estate subject to a duty to re-
imburse the owners of the real estate interests (other than the
debtor) for the cost of repair of any physical injury to the real
estate.210
(4) A security interest in items that "are or are to become
Code, Hanft, Article Nine: Secured Transactions-Validity, Rights of
Parties; Default, 44 N.C.L. Rlv. 716, 732 (1966), and therefore would not be
affected by G. S. § 25-9-312(2).207 G.S. § 25-9-313(1).
208 G.S. § 25-9-313(2), (4).
209 G.S. § 25-9-313(3), (4).21 G.S. § 25-9-313(5).
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fixtures" can be perfected only by filing in the county where the
land to which the items are affixed is located.21
These rules, in fundamental approach, are, with the exception
of the place of filing, virtually identical to the present state of
North Carolina law. The most often referred to North Carolina
case, Standard Motors Fin. Co. v. Weaver,212 involved a situation
where the only competing interests were a recorded conditional sales
contract covering a sprinkler system and a purchaser at the fore-
closure sale of a mortgage on the real estate to which the sprinkler
system was attached. The court held that the conditional vendor
had priority over the interests of the mortgagee of the real prop-
erty, and, since the conditional sales contract was recorded (in the
chattel-mortgage file), the interest of the conditional vendor would
also have priority over the purchaser at the foreclosure sale. The
court reasoned that the execution of the conditional sales contract
by the vendee indicated an intention that the property remain per-
sonalty, and because it retained its character as such, the proper
place of recording was the chattel-mortgage file in the county where
the debtor resided.
The other important aspect of the secured party's rights-the
right of removal of the item from the realty in the event of default
-has also been dealt with in a manner favorable to the secured
party. In Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. Carolina Bowling
Alleys, Inw.,2"' the court held that the removal by the conditional
vendor of a large amount of bowling equipment affixed to the
realty owned by the debtor's lessor would be permitted even though
material injury to the realty would result from the removal where
the injury was of a type that could be repaired by an expenditure
of money.214
Application of the basic Code rules to these situations, assum-
ing a recording in the real-estate files in the Standard Motors case,
would give results identical to those reached by the North Carolina
courts. 215 But, however close to identical the results might be, the
211 G.S. § 25-9-401(1)(b). The financing statement must be filed and
indexed in the same manner as a mortgage on real estate would be recorded.
G.S. § 25-9-403 (4).
.12 199 N.C. 178, 153 S.E. 861 (1930).
218204 N.C. 609, 169 S.E. 186 (1933).
"
1
' Bit see Cox v. New Bern Lighting & Fuel Co., 151 N.C. 62, 67, 65
S.E. 648, 651 (1909) (dictum).
21 The North Carolina rule on right of removal as stated by the court
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fact that the results are reached on entirely different grounds possi-
bly will preclude what would otherwise be an anticipated displace-
ment of the North Carolina cases by section 9-313.
The Code rules have application only to those goods that under
state law are or are to become fixtures.216 As generally used here-
tofore in North Carolina, the word "fixture" refers to a real-prop-
erty interest, not personal property.217 It is quite possible that the
court will continue to hold, on the authority of the Standard Motors
case, that the execution of a security interest in items to be at-
tached to realty indicated an intention that the items that are affixed
should remain personal property. It would logically follow that the
personal property is not a "fixture" under this state's law, and
therefore, section 9-313 and, more importantly, subsection 9-
401(1) (b) have no application to such a transaction. 18 If this
conclusion is reached by the court, the vendor or mortgagee of
goods that were attached to realty would not have a validly per-
fected security interest if he filed in the county where the land
was located. Perfection could be achieved only by filing in the
manner applicable generally to security interests in personal prop-
erty. This would leave the purchaser of the real property in the pre-
viously existing position of having to search the chattel files in any
county where his vendor may have resided or had a place of busi-
ness before he can be certain of the state of title of items affixed
to the property.
The semantic entanglement and the uncertainty surrounding the
term "fixtures" can be avoided only by definitive action of the court
or the legislature. The court might conclude that the reasoning in
the Standard Motors case was dictated by a sound desire to insure
in the Brunswick case would presumably put upon the secured party, as a
condition to removal, the burden of demonstrating that the damage caused to
the real estate could be repaired by an expenditure of money. G.S. §
25-9-313(5), gives the secured party an absolute right of removal, thus pre-
suming that all damage can be compensated for in money. The difference
in approach would have little practical significance in most cases.
216 G.S. § 25-9-313(1); G.S. 25-9-401(1)(b).
"1 Brown v. North Carolina joint Stock Land Bank, 213 N.C. 594, 597,
197 S.E. 140, 142 (1938) ; Basnight v. Small, 163 N.C. 15, 18, 79 S.E. 269,
270 (1913). But see Home v. Smith, 105 N.C. 322, 323, 11 S.E. 373, 374
(1890).
( ' Such was the reasoning of the court in Cain v. Country Club Delica-
tessen, Inc., 25 Conn. Supp. 327, 203 A.2d 441 (1964). See also In re West
Hartford Club Car, Inc., 2 UCC REPORTING SERV. 738 (D. Conn. April 16,
1964).
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a method, in absence of legislative action, whereby the conditional
vendor or chattel mortgagee could protect his interest. Necessary
to the protection at that time was the conclusion that the item
remained personal property so that a valid recording could be made
in the chattel-mortgage file. Such a conclusion is not, under the
Code, an integral step toward the secured party's protection. The
court could rely upon a more conventional test of physical attach-
ment and integration of use, rather than the somewhat fictional
intent attributed to the fact of encumbrance, to determine whether
or not an item becomes a fixture under the Code. This would give
the secured party the same degree of protection he now enjoys
while at the same time giving more certainty to real-estate titles by
requiring filing in the county where the land is located. Or the
legislature could amend section 9-313 to define fixture in terms of
physical attachment and integration of use. Of course, any defini-
tion of fixture is going to leave an area of uncertainty at the outer
edges of the concept. But the secured party could protect against
that uncertainty by filing as if the item were a fixture and as
if it were a chattel.
But, until there has been an interpretation of the word "fixture"
as used under the Code, either by the court or the legislature, the
secured party who takes an interest in any personal property that
is to be attached to or used in connection with real property will
be well advised to file both in the county where the land is located
and the county dictated under subsection 9-401 (1) (a) by the
debtor's situation.
D. The Security Interest in Proceeds
Like the common law of many jurisdictions19 and statutes220
before it, Article 9 provides that a security interest in collateral
will extend to identifiable proceeds arising from the sale of that
collateral by the debtor.221 This security interest will attach to the
',
9 E.g., Watson v. Carolina Portland Cement Co., 93 Miss. 553, 46 So.
707 (1908); Doughten v. Gray, 10 N.J. Eq. (2 Stock.) 323 (1855). But cf.
Presley E. Brown Lumber Co. v. Textile Banking Co., 248 N.C. 308, 103
S.E.2d 334 (1958).
"°E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-54 (Supp. 1965) (Uniform Trust Re-
ceipts Act); N.C. Gnx. STAT. § 44-73 (Supp. 1965) (Factor's Lien Act);
N.C. Gmr. STAT. § 44-83 (1950) (accounts receivable) ; all repealed effective
July 1, 1967, G.S. § 25-10-102.
221 G.S. § 25-9-306(2). "'Proceeds' includes whatever is received when
collateral or proceeds is sold, exchanged, collected or otherwise disposed of.
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identifiable proceeds as they come into the hands of the debtor
without regard to whether the original security agreement specifi-
cally included proceeds. Also irrelevant is the question of whether
the secured party authorized the sale by the debtor.
However, the mere existence of a security interest is of little
value to the secured party in the critical situation-insolvency of
the debtor-where a representative of the debtor's estate will take
the collateral free of any unperfected security interest therein. m2
Therefore, the Code further provides that, if the security interest
in the original collateral was perfected, the security interest in the
proceeds is automatically perfected for ten days after the receipt
thereof by the debtor. m3 The ten-day perfection may be extended
indefinitely by the secured party in one of two ways.
First, if the security interest in the original collateral was per-
fected by filing and the filed financing statement contained a claim
to proceeds, perfection of the security interest in proceeds will con-
tinue beyond the ten-day period until termination of the filing.
Presumably, in this situation, perfection may be had by "filing"
even though the character of the proceeds would not permit an
original perfection by filing. m4
Second, if the secured party did not perfect the original security
interest by filing or failed to claim proceeds in the original financ-
ing statement, he may continue the perfection by, during the ten-
day period, perfecting a security interest in "the proceeds."' r'
Where this latter course is the only one open for continued per-
fection, the method whereby the secured party may perfect is not
certain from the language of the Code or the comments. Where
the proceeds are a class of collateral in which a security interest
might originally be perfected by filing-goods, negotiable docu-
ments, chattel paper, accounts, contract rights, or general intangi-
bles-the interest in proceeds may be perfected by filing a financing
statement describing the original collateral and claiming the pro-
ceeds. In this instance, the secured party may file the financing
The term also includes the account arising when the right to payment is
earned under a contract right. Money, checks and the like are 'cash pro-
ceeds.' All other proceeds are 'non-cash proceeds.'" G.S. § 25-9-306(1).
222G.S. § 25-9-301(1)(a), (3); Bankruptcy Act § 70 (c), 30 Stat. 565(1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § l10(c) (1964).
223G.S. § 25-9-306(3).
"G.S. § 25-9-306(3) (a).
.. G.S. § 25-9-306(3) (b).
1966]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
statement without the cooperation of the debtor-the debtor's sig-
nature is not required on a financing statement filed for this pur-
pose.226 If, however, "the proceeds" are a class of collateral in
which a security interest cannot originally be perfected by filing,
e.g., instruments, the secured party probably can continue perfec-
tion only by taking possession of "the proceeds" within the ten-day
period. 7
When the security interest in proceeds remains perfected during
the ten-day period, and thereafter, if the appropriate steps have been
taken before or during the ten-day period, the perfection is ostensi-
bly deemed to be continuous from the time of the perfection of the
security interest in the original collateral.228 Where there are two
security interests in the original collateral antedating the sale of
the collateral, this provision probably will insure to the secured
party holding the prior security interest in the original collateral
priority with reference to the proceeds, at least where the original
priority is based upon first filing or first perfection. ' 2  Less certain
is the priority in proceeds where the original priority is based upon
the special purchase-money priority rules. For example, suppose
that the original collateral was subject to a first filed after-acquired-
property security interest and a filed purchase-money security inter-
est entitled to priority under subsection 9-312(3) or (4). When
this collateral is sold, does the purchase-money priority follow and
attach to the proceeds? It is arguable that the close identification of
proceeds with original collateral resulting from the continuous per-
fection theory indicates an intent that the perfected security interest
in proceeds have the identical priority that would have been given
to the security interest in the original collateral. Furthermore, par-
ticularly with reference to inventory, the purchase-money priority
would be substantially undercut if that same priority did not attach
to the proceeds of goods that by definition are to be sold and con-
verted into proceeds.
226 G.S. § 25-9-402(2) (b).
227 See G.S. § 25-9-306, comment 2(b).
228 G.S. § 25-9-306(3)
"29 The time of perfection of the security interest in proceeds would be
the time of the perfection of the original security interest. Presumably, also
the method of perfection of the security interest in proceeds for the purpose
of applying the priority rules of § 9-312(5) would be deemed to be the
method whereby the security interest in the original collateral was initially
perfected, although this is by no means clear from § 9-306.
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The continuous perfection theory also represents an attempt to
take the time of transfer, for bankruptcy preference problems,23 °
back to the time of the original perfection."' If successful, this, of
course, may remove the time of transfer from the critical four-
month period preceding bankruptcy and may have the effect of
making the transfer for a present consideration rather than for an
antecedent debt. However, even if the courts should refuse to take
the time of transfer of the proceeds back to the time of the original
perfection, or if the original perfection took place within the four-
month period, the secured party, at least where the original collateral
is inventory, or where he authorized the sale, should not be pre-
sented with a preference problem. At the moment that the goods
are exchanged for the proceeds by the debtor, the security interest
in the proceeds attaches and becomes perfected. Thus, the secured
party contemporaneously loses the right to enforce his security inter-
est against the goods and gains a perfected security interest in the
proceeds. A simultaneous exchange of one perfected, nonpreferen-
tial security interest for another valid and perfected security interest
of equal or less value is generally not considered to be a prefer-
ential transfer in bankruptcy, '2 nor should such a transfer of pro-
ceeds be so considered in this context.
But, where the secured party retains a perfected security interest
enforceable against the purchaser of the collateral and also claims
a perfected security interest in the proceeds of the sale of that
collateral,"' he is likely to fare less well in bankruptcy by his con-
Bankruptcy Act § 60(a), 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 tJ.S.C.
§ 101 (1964).
G.S. § 25-9-306, comment 2(b).See generally, 3 CoLLiER, BANKRUPTCY 60.21 (14th ed. 1964).
G.S. § 25-9-306, comment 3, indicates that the secured party may have
a security interest in the proceeds and the original collateral, if the pur-
chaser does not take free of the latter, "but of course may have only one
satisfaction." However, except where the purchaser had knowledge of the
security interest or the jurisdiction holds that record notice precludes re-
liance on misrepresentation, it is difficult to conceive a situation where the
secured party would, as a practical matter, need and be able to enforce the
security interest against both the identifiable proceeds and the original
collateral. In other situations, there almost certainly would have been fraud
or misrepresentation by the seller that would permit the purchaser to rescind
the transaction. See 5 WImiSTON, CO NTRAcTs § 1525 (rev. ed. 1937),
return the collateral, and, particularly if the seller is insolvent, impose a
constructive trust on the consideration which he gave the "proceeds." R-
STATEMENT, RESTITUTION §§ 160, 166 (1937). The secured party would by
acquisition of the security interest be a third-party purchaser of the pro-
ceeds, but it would seem that he should be charged with notice of the un-
1966]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tention that, because the security interest in the proceeds is deemed
perfected at the time of perfection of the security interest in the
original collateral, the transfer is outside the four-month period or
not for an antecedent debt and hence not a preference. If the
original collateral was not of sufficient value at the time of the sale
to satisfy the debtor's obligation, the secured party will be in a
tenuous position in claiming that he should also be given a secured
claim in the proceeds sufficient to satisfy the remainder of the obli-
gation. This is not a substitution of collateral situation, and the
transfer does give to the secured party a preferred claim by enhanc-
ing the value of his security above its value before the sale by the
debtor. Furthermore, it is difficult for this author to see how the
security interest in proceeds in this situation can be deemed per-
fected and the transfer made at a time when no proceeds existed,
i.e., at the time of perfection of the security interest in the original
collateral. Other requisites being present, this would probably be
a preference to the extent the secured party acquires interest of
greater value than the original collateral at the time of the sale.
In addition to the security interest in identifiable proceeds, which
arises as a matter of course in any situation, the Code purports to
give the secured party additional protection in a limited context. It
is provided that, in the event of the institution of insolvency proceed-
ings by or against the debtor, the secured party shall also have a
"perfected security interest" in all cash and bank accounts of the
debtor, but limited to an "amount not greater than the amount of
any cash proceeds received by the debtor within ten days before the
institution of the insolvency proceedings . . . less the amount of
cash proceeds paid over to the secured party during the ten day
period." 2 4
authorized sale and the probability that it resulted from misrepresentation
of the seller so as to preclude him from being a bona fide purchaser and
taking free of the constructive trust rights of the innocent purchaser. Re-
ferring to the secured party's interest as "perfected" would not seem to add
anything to his rights against the purchaser with respect to the proceeds.
22'G.S. § 25-9-306(4). The security interest is, however, subject to any
right of setoff that the bank might have.
Beyond the scope of this paper is examination of the effectiveness of
this subsection in bankruptcy proceedings, a problem that has engendered
considerable detailed discussion. Those persons desiring to sustain the valid-
ity of the security interest in bankruptcy should see Henson, "Proceeds"
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 CoLum. L. REv. 232 (1965). The
possible objections to enforcement of the interest are detailed in Kennedy,
Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Prob-
lems Suggested by Articles 2 and 9, 14 RUTGERs L. Rnv. 518 (1960).
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